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THE CORE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PUZZLE: 
CONTEXTUALIZING THE LINK TO PERFORMANCE 
MERRITT B. FOX,* RONALD J. GILSON** & DARIUS PALIA*** 
There is a puzzle at the core of corporate governance theory. Prior 
scholarship reports a strong relationship between firms best at creating 
shareholder value and those rated highly by the established corporate 
governance indices. Little work explores why, however. We hypothesize that 
the link between governance and performance depends centrally on context. 
We illustrate the importance of context by exploring circumstances when a 
firm’s governance structure can operate as a signal of the quality of its 
management. The idea is that better managers are on average more likely to 
choose a highly rated governance structure than are bad managers because a 
structure garnering a high rating increases the risk of job loss more for bad 
managers than for good ones. Conversely, the choice of a poorly rated 
governance structure signals negative information about managerial quality 
because good managers would not wish to make a false negative signal. 
Signals of managerial quality can take on particular significance under certain 
circumstances. 
This Article tests empirically the hypothesis that a particular context—the 
existence of an especially high information asymmetry between a firm’s 
insiders and the market concerning the quality of its management—is a 
situation in which a change in the firm’s governance structure will become a 
stronger signal concerning its management’s quality. The test compares 
ordinary times with 2000-2002, a period of unprecedented corporate 
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accounting scandals that led to greater than usual uncertainty as to which 
firms had the better managers. We show that an index-score-altering change in 
governance structure during these accounting scandal years is associated with 
a much larger change in a measure of firm value creation—Tobin’s Q—than a 
comparable governance change in the years before or after the accounting 
scandal period. By running both OLS and fixed effect regressions, we are able 
to show that the market’s perception of the effectiveness of a highly-rated 
governance structure at better incentivizing managers, or at filtering out bad 
ones, was not significantly different in the scandal years than in the years 
before or after. Thus, “signaling”—the third possible causal link between 
good scores and higher Tobin’s Q—must have been at work. The reasoning is 
that the clarifying signal arising from a governance change should have a 
bigger effect in a period of greater uncertainty as to which firms had good 
managers. This conclusion is further confirmed by empirical evidence that the 
impact of a governance change on Tobin’s Q during the scandal years was 
especially elevated for firms engaging in substantial amounts of R&D. Such 
firms have been shown by other studies to be generally more opaque.  
These results also teach a larger lesson: the impact of governance is in 
important respects contextual, depending on the particular circumstances of 
the time, and the particular characteristics of the firms, involved. This point, 
largely missed to date, helps illuminate the current debate concerning the 
corporate governance index studies. It suggests that that there is an 
empirically verified theory that provides one explanation for the index studies’ 
strong results linking governance structure with firm value creation, but that, 
rather than a single link between the specified corporate governance 
provisions and performance, a range of linkages are possible whose direction 
and intensity depend centrally on the particular context in which a firm is 
operating. 
INTRODUCTION 
There is a critical puzzle at the core of corporate governance theory: Is 
corporate performance really linked to a firm’s governance structure? 
Promoting “good” corporate governance has become a global industry. Large 
international organizations such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (“OECD”) have adopted corporate governance codes of best 
practice1 and major institutional investors have adopted guidelines setting out 
 
1 See, e.g., OECD, G20/OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2015); see also 
ECONOMIESUISSE, SWISS CODE OF BEST PRACTICE FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2014). 
Codes covering particular countries have also proliferated. These are available on the 
European Corporate Governance Institute’s website. See Codes, EUROPEAN CORP. 
GOVERNANCE INST., https://ecgi.global/content/codes [https://perma.cc/NMY3-5U9A] (last 
visited Aug. 10, 2019). 
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how they will vote the shares in their portfolio on governance issues.2 As well, 
corporate governance concerns were at the center of the conditions that the 
IMF imposed on financial assistance to countries after the East Asian financial 
crisis.3 In the United States, both the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation following the 
Millennium accounting scandals and the Dodd-Frank legislation following the 
“Great Recession” sought, among other things, to improve the corporate 
governance practices of the companies the statutes cover.4 In turn, Delaware 
courts over the last twenty-five years have devoted a great deal of attention to 
reshaping and highlighting the governance content of Delaware corporate law.5  
This emphasis on corporate governance is built on the premise that “better” 
corporate governance structures lead to greater firm value. Here, though, is 
where the core puzzle comes into play. A nagging concern persists as to 
whether this foundational premise is accurate.6 This concern suggests three 
 
2 See, e.g., BLACKROCK, GLOBAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE & ENGAGEMENT PRINCIPLES 
(2014), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/890393/000119312515334865/d25691dex99corpg
ov.htm [https://perma.cc/667T-L7MU] (setting out BlackRock’s approach to engaging with 
companies through proxy voting and board communication); CAL. PUB. EMPS.’ RET. SYS., 
GLOBAL PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTABLE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2011), 
https://www.iccr.org/sites/default/files/resources_attachments/2011-11-14-global-principles-
of-accountable-corp-gov.pdf [https://perma.cc/W6X4-B6MD] (providing framework by 
which CalPERS executes its proxy voting). 
3 See Timothy Lane et al., INT’L MONETARY FUND, POLICY DEV. & REVIEW DEP’T, IMF-
SUPPORTED PROGRAMS IN INDONESIA, KOREA, AND THAILAND: A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT 
72-73 (1999); see also John M. Broder, Asia Pacific Talks Vow Tough Action on Economic 
Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1998, at A1 (outlining Asia Pacific economic summit reforms 
;. 
4 Sarbanes-Oxley, for example, aims to improve auditor quality, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 7231-
7234 (2012) (regulating auditor independence); promote the independence of audit 
committees of listed corporations, see id. § 78j-1 (adding requirements for formation and 
maintenance of audit committees); and increase corporate managers’ responsibility for 
financial disclosures, see id. § 7241 (requirements of quarterly reports). Dodd-Frank 
implemented a host of governing reforms as well, focusing in particular on executive 
compensation structures. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 951-957, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899-907 (imposing requirements 
regarding executive compensation, including shareholder vote). 
5 See, e.g., Jack B. Jacobs, Fifty Years of Corporate Law Evolution: A Delaware Judge’s 
Retrospective, 5 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 141, 141-44 (2015) (analyzing expansion of officers’ 
fiduciary duties and evolution of corresponding Delaware courts’ standards of review ). 
6 For example, empirical studies generally do not show that independent directors, the 
centerpiece of the post-1970s corporate governance reforms, are associated with higher firm 
value. See, e.g., Sanjai Baghat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship between Board 
Composition and Firm Performance, 54 BUS. LAW. 921, 922 (1999) (“However, studies of 
overall firm performance have found no convincing evidence that firms with majority-
independent boards perform better than firms without such boards.”). 
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central questions: Is there in fact a relationship between the firm’s governance 
structure and its capacity to create value, and if so, when and why? 
A large academic literature in law and finance has arisen that seeks to test 
empirically the link between certain corporate governance attributes and firm 
value.7 One genre in particular—the index study—suggests a positive 
relationship between a firm’s performance and the quality of its corporate 
governance. The index lists a set of what the author believes to be favorable 
governance attributes and assesses the quality of a firm’s governance by 
counting how many of these attributes a firm displays.8 These studies show a 
statistically and economically significant positive relationship between firms 
with governance structures that receive favorable index ratings and their 
Tobin’s Qs, a widely used measure of firm value creation.9 
Other scholars, though, have challenged these index studies, arguing that 
there is no sensible story to explain how many of the governance attributes that 
determine a company’s index rating could in fact affect firm value.10 For 
example, not currently having a poison pill takeover defense in place is scored 
in the index studies as a positive attribute. However, a firm’s board, without 
shareholder approval, can quickly adopt a pill if its management feels the need 
in the face of an actual immediate takeover threat. Hence, the critics argue, the 
absence of a pill prior to such an immediate threat should have no consequence 
 
7 This literature is discussed in Parts I and IV. As an example of the subject’s attraction, 
from 1995 through August 29, 2013, more than a quarter of all articles published by the 
Journal of Financial Economics were related to corporate governance. Out of a total of 
1,533 articles, 414 (twenty-seven percent) dealt with corporate governance (authors’ 
calculation).  
8 The two most prominent indices are the G index and the E index. The G index was 
originally designed for use in the study reported in Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii & Andrew 
Metrick, Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q.J. ECON. 107, 107 (2003). The E 
index was originally designed for use in the study reported in Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen 
& Allen Ferrell, What Matters in Corporate Governance, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 783, 785 
(2009). These studies are discussed in more detail in Part I, infra. 
9 See Bebchuk, Cohen & Ferrell, supra note 8, at 785 (finding that unfavorable 
entrenching governance provisions correlate with lower firm valuation); Gompers, Ishii & 
Metrick, supra note 8, at 144 (“We find that corporate governance is strongly correlated 
with stock returns during the 1990s.”). 
10 See, e.g., Emiliano M. Catan & Marcel Kahan, The Law and Finance of Antitakeover 
Statutes, 68 STAN. L. REV. 629, 668-69 (2016) (arguing that variables used in index studies 
often have little actual impact); Michael Klausner, Fact and Fiction in Corporate Law and 
Governance, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1325, 1364 (2013) (arguing that G Index includes many 
elements that have no significant impact on entrenchment); David F. Larcker, Peter C. Reiss 
& Youfei Xiao, Corporate Governance Data and Measures Revisited 6 (Rock Ctr. of Corp. 
Governance, Working Paper Series No. 211, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2694802 
[https://perma.cc/J966-LTL2] (arguing that “systematic measurement issues in the coding of 
IRRC profiles” has caused inaccurate findings based on G and E indexes).  
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for firm value.11 In effect, any company not having a pill already in place has a 
“shadow” pill that can be activated at any moment and achieve exactly the 
same effects.12 
But these criticisms raise their own problem: they advance a theory as to 
why the index studies should not yield empirical results, but no theory as to 
why they nevertheless appear to do so. Given the absence of careful theory on 
either side, we come face to face with the core corporate governance puzzle: 
what is the link between governance and performance?13 
Our central thesis is that corporate governance is more complicated, and its 
effects more contingent, than the governance theories used to construct the 
indices on which the governance index studies are based. This point is largely 
missed by the debate to date.14 The existing index studies, for example, only 
measure the average impact of a set of attributes on firm value across a large 
number of corporations over a considerable period of time.15 Because the 
existing studies do not distinguish between different times and 
circumstances—i.e., differences in context—they observe only an average. 
Most firms, though, are not average. That a more complicated story may be at 
work should not be surprising to careful observers of the corporate world. They 
would find it highly likely that, rather than a single link between the specified 
corporate governance provisions and performance, a range of linkages are 
possible whose direction and intensity depend centrally on the particular 
 
11 See, e.g., John C. Coates, IV, Takeover Defenses in the Shadow of the Pill: A Critique 
of the Scientific Evidence, 79 TEX. L. REV. 271, 271 (2000) (arguing that poison pill studies 
do not support the common belief that pills reduce firm value); Emiliano M. Catan, The 
Insignificance of Clear-Day Poison Pills, 48 J.L. STUD.  (forthcoming Jan. 2019) 
(manuscript at 2-5), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2836223 [https://perma.cc/2GAP-7QNL] 
(arguing that adopting a poison pill absent an actual bid does not cause drop in firm value). 
12 See Coates, supra note 11, at 286. 
13 More recent studies using ever more sophisticated econometrics show that, contrary to 
the index skeptics, certain defensive governance attributes such as having a pill in place on 
an ongoing basis result in fewer takeovers over time. But these studies’ authors stress that 
their results are “atheoretic”: no hypotheses are offered to explain the link between these 
governance attributes and shareholders’ receipt of fewer premium offers. See Jonathan M. 
Karpoff, Robert J. Schonlau & Eric W. Wehrly, Which Antitakeover Provisions Matter 1 
(Apr. 18, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3142195 
[https://perma.cc/Q3ZJ-69DN] (providing data-driven analysis with no theoretical 
hypothesis). 
14 One exception is Bernard S. Black, Antonio Gledson de Carvalho & Érica Gorga, 
What Matters and for Which Firms for Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets?: 
Evidence from Brazil (and other BRIK Countries), 18 J. CORP. FIN. 934, 946-49 (2012), 
where the authors argue that the impact of governance elements is context specific, and so 
can be expected to have different results in different countries. This is a particularized 
version of the more general critique that tests of the impact of governance elements too 
often lack an institutional grounding for the tested hypotheses. 
15 See Gompers, Ishii & Metrick, supra note 8, at 108 (describing approach as “long-run 
event study”). 
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context in which a firm is operating. From this perspective, the impact of 
governance on firm performance is second order except when circumstances 
make it important. 
This Article is an early contribution to a different approach to corporate 
governance research: a more focused inquiry into the particular circumstances 
in which the observed empirical link between governance and performance can 
be both supported in theory and demonstrated empirically.16 Specifically, we 
test the hypothesis that corporate governance attributes in some circumstances 
can serve as credible signals of the quality of a firm’s management and that 
these signals matter more in situations when the market lacks good information 
concerning managerial quality. If we can show that a link between governance 
and performance depends on context—in our study, the extent of information 
asymmetry concerning managerial quality—we can begin understand better the 
relationship between governance and firm performance. Beyond signaling, 
there are almost certainly additional context-dependent links between 
governance and firm performance that further theoretical and empirical work 
can reveal. This study is a first step in showing the way. 
We examine our context-dependent signaling hypothesis in two ways: 
comparing time periods that differ in terms of the reliability of other 
information concerning managerial quality, and comparing types of firms that 
differ in terms of the reliability of other such information. With regard to 
comparing time periods, we take advantage of a natural experiment that arose 
when uncertainty concerning management quality was widely reported to have 
spiked: the 2000-2002 period, when a series of high-profile accounting 
scandals, such as Enron and WorldCom, shook the financial world. With 
regard to types of firms, we compare firms engaging in substantial R&D, 
which studies suggest are harder for the market to evaluate,17 with firms that 
 
16 Professors Martijn Cremers and Allen Ferrell in a fashion precede us in this endeavor 
by identifying a temporal factor affecting the relationship between a good index score and 
firm value. They demonstrate a difference between the period before and after the Delaware 
Supreme Court’s decision in Moran v. Household International, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1357 
(Del. 1985), in which the Delaware Supreme Court found the adoption of a poison pill as a 
defense against a hostile takeover attempt to be a valid exercise of board authority. Martijn 
Cremers & Allen Ferrell, Thirty Years of Shareholder Rights and Firm Value, 69 J. FIN. 
1167, 1168-71 (2014) (utilizing G Index factors while taking into account “shock to the 
importance of shareholder rights” caused by Moran). However, the Cremers and Ferrell 
study also presents institutional problems. The form of poison pill involved in the Moran 
case was a generally ineffective flip-over pill. Only some time later was the current, more 
effective, flip-in pill developed. See RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND 
FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 740-48 (2d ed. 1995) (discussing early adoption of 
flip in poison pills). See generally Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d. 48 
(Del. Ch. 2011). 
17 See, e.g., David Aboody & Baruch Lev, Information Asymmetry, R&D, and Insider 
Gains, 55 J. FIN. 2747, 2765 (2000) (demonstrating that unique nature of R&D causes a 
large information asymmetry between managers and investors); Bronwyn H. Hall & Josh 
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do not. We report evidence supporting our management quality-based 
signaling hypothesis in each of these two ways. In essence, we see that the 
greater the market’s uncertainty concerning a firm’s managerial quality at a 
particular moment in time, the bigger the impact of a governance change on 
the market’s valuation of the firm. 
This empirical demonstration of our signaling hypothesis is significant. To 
start, the result is important in itself. It is useful to better understand the 
reasons for the observed relationship between corporate governance and 
measures of firm value, and our empirical results support an explanation not 
previously identified in the literature. Moreover, reducing information 
asymmetry between the market and corporate insiders makes share prices more 
accurate, which enhances the efficiency of our overall economy.18 In 
evaluating what assistance government regulations can provide in this regard, 
it is valuable to identify as well what market-based forces are at work. Even 
more important, however, is the contribution to the law and finance literature 
concerning corporate governance provided by our demonstration that the 
impact of governance is in important respects contextual, depending on the 
particular circumstances of the measurement period and the particular 
characteristics of the firms involved. Our results suggest not just the familiar 
(though often neither well-framed nor well-tested) claim that one size of 
governance does not fit all companies,19 but also suggest that what size is right 
for a particular company can differ over time. 
Our analysis proceeds as follows. Part I describes the corporate governance 
index studies reporting empirical evidence that firms with better-rated 
governance structures have better economic performance. We describe how 
these indices are created, and how the typical gauge of the firm’s success at 
creating value, Tobin’s Q, is measured.  
Part II sets out our signaling hypothesis. It discusses three non-mutually-
exclusive theories for explaining the observed relationship between more 
highly rated governance structures and measures of firm value. The first two 
theories focus on how better rated corporate governance structures lead to 
firms being better managed: first, by filtering out bad managers; and second, 
 
Lerner, The Financing of R&D and Innovation, in 1 HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF 
INNOVATION 610, 623-24 (Bronwyn H. Hall & Nathan Rosenberg eds., 2010) (stating that 
R&D is difficult to value and fund); Pierre Barbaroux, From Market Failures to Market 
Opportunities: Managing Innovation Under Asymmetric Innovation, J. INNOVATION & 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP, Jan. 2014, at 1, 12, https://innovation-
entrepreneurship.springeropen.com/track/pdf/10.1186/2192-5372-3-5 
[https://perma.cc/HM9S-VQRW] (stating that information asymmetries related to R&D 
both cause market failures and provide opportunities for innovation). 
18 See Barbaroux, supra note 17, at 3 (explaining mainstream belief that information 
asymmetries cause market inefficiencies). 
19 See Martin Lipton & Paul K. Rowe, The Inconvenient Truth About Corporate 
Governance: Some Thoughts on Vice-Chancellor Strine’s Essay, 33 J. CORP. L. 64, 68 
(2007) (arguing against imposing a one-size-fits-all governance requirements). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3447941 
  
108 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:ppp 
 
by better motivating and informing managers regardless of their ability level. 
The third theory, in contrast, looks at a causal link running the other way: how 
better firm managers steer their firms toward better rated governance structures 
in order to credibly reveal information concerning management quality, and 
how poor managers reveal information about their quality by selecting a lower 
rated structure. This third theory suggests that a firm’s governance structure 
can be a signal concerning a firm’s managerial quality, a characteristic that is 
difficult for the market to observe directly. Specifically, we posit that in 
periods of greater information asymmetry concerning the quality of a firm’s 
management (one context), or where a firm’s particular characteristics lead to 
more than average levels of such asymmetry (a second context), the firm’s 
corporate governance attributes will serve as a stronger signal—positive or 
negative—of management quality. In essence, changes in a firm’s corporate 
governance structure can in particular contexts act as a signal of its managerial 
quality, and the less that is otherwise known about the quality of its 
management, the bigger the signal’s impact.  
Part III reports our empirical tests of this signaling hypothesis. It first 
describes the time-period-based variation in context: a comparison between 
normal times and the period involving the millennial accounting scandals, 
including Enron, WorldCom and others, including the capital market’s reaction 
to them. We then then set out our two central empirical findings. The first is 
that a change in a company’s governance index score during the period of the 
accounting scandals resulted in a very much larger change in Tobin’s Q—the 
measure of firm value—than did score changes in the years both preceding and 
following the accounting scandal period.20 We take advantage of differences 
between ordinary least squares (“OLS”) and fixed-effects regression 
methodologies to show that it is the signaling link between a firm’s governance 
rating and its Tobin’s Q that is responsible for this much bigger change in Q 
during the scandal period, rather than the two alternative explanations: 
corporate governance filtering out bad managers, or better motivating and 
informing existing managers of any quality. Put differently, as another kind of 
information concerning management quality—accounting reports—came to be 
viewed during the scandal period as less reliable than at other times, the signal 
that we study—a firm’s change in a governance structure—took on greater 
importance and hence had greater impact on the firm’s market valuation.  
Our second central finding is that a change in a company’s governance 
index score has on average a bigger impact on the firm’s Tobin Q if the firm is 
engaging in substantial R&D activity than if it is not.21 Substantial R&D 
independently adds to information asymmetry concerning a firm’s 
management quality and hence again heightens the importance of governance 
structure as a credible managerial quality signal. 
 
20 See infra Part III.B. 
21 See id. 
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Part IV explores the larger lessons of these results for the study of corporate 
governance. We explain how the results support our core hypotheses: that the 
relationship between corporate governance and performance is in important 
respects contextual, with the strength of this relationship depending on the time 
period involved and the particular characteristics of the firm. This central point 
helps both to illuminate the index study debate and to enrich our understanding 
of corporate governance more generally. 
I. THE INDEX STUDIES 
Index studies, which score firms based on their particular corporate 
governance attributes and then test whether better rated firms create more 
value for investors, play a prominent role in the empirical corporate 
governance literature.22 As already noted, index studies have shown a positive 
link between a firm’s governance and its capacity to create value, but have also 
been the subject of some cogent criticism—that in actual operation, some of 
the attributes that make up the index cannot affect firm performance.23 While 
we save discussion of the criticism until Part IV, it is helpful at the outset to 
explain how the index studies work and an important reason for their creation. 
Event studies of the adoption or removal of individual governance attributes 
are plagued by an endogeniety problem—the difficulty in determining whether 
the change in a firm’s value that accompanies the change in any particular 
attribute is due to the attribute change itself or is due instead simply to 
whatever contextual factor prompted the attribute’s change.24 
A. Governance Index Construction 
The two most commonly used corporate governance indices are the “G” and 
“E” indices,25 on which we will focus here. Each index’s authors posit a list of 
corporate governance attributes that they believe affect the quality of corporate 
decision making. For example, the G and E indices each include on their 
attribute list whether a company has a board whose members are all elected 
annually or has a staggered board.26 The apparent reasoning for including this 
attribute starts with the observation that a poorly run firm can be an attractive 
takeover target because an acquirer can make the firm more valuable simply by 
substituting better management.27 A staggered board, however, reduces the 
likelihood of poor managers being replaced in this way because, when 
 
22 See supra text accompanying notes 7-8. 
23 See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
24 See Catan & Kahan, supra note 10, at 668-69 (arguing that index studies commonly 
misinterpret whether selected governance attributes actually cause change in firm value). 
25 See Bebchuk, Cohen & Ferrell, supra note 8, at 785 (creating E index); Gompers, Ishii 
& Metrick, supra note 8, at 107 (creating G index);. 
26 See Bebchuk, Cohen & Ferrell, supra note 8, at 791 ; Gompers, Ishii & Metrick, supra 
note 8, at 146-47. 
27 See Bebchuk, Cohen & Ferrell, supra note 8, at 791. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3447941 
  
110 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:ppp 
 
combined with a poison pill, the presence of a staggered board requires a 
hostile bidder to run two successful annual proxy contests before it can take 
control of the firm.28 This is a highly unattractive prospect to a prospective 
bidder, indeed one that the Chancellor of Delaware a few years back believed 
had never been attempted.29 Thus, if a poorly run firm has a staggered board, 
its incumbent managers have less incentive to improve and there is less chance 
of a takeover by a hostile bidder who will install better managers. In essence, 
including the absence of a staggered board on the list of positive attributes 
reflects an index author’s belief that exposing a company’s management to 
capital market discipline improves its governance.  
The G index contains twenty-four governance attributes. The E index is 
composed of only six of the G index’s attributes, each of which is said to relate 
to the company’s ability to protect itself from a hostile control change and 
hence to reduce the capital market’s ability to discipline poor performance.30  
For each attribute on an index’s list, a firm is assigned a score of zero if it 
has the positive attribute and one if it does not.31 A firm’s score with respect to 
each attribute in the index is then summed to obtain its overall governance 
rating.32 The lower the total, the more favorable the rating. As this zero-one 
scoring indicates, neither index attempts to measure the relative importance of, 
or interaction among, individual attributes.33 Nor, as is important to us here, 
does either index reflect an assessment of whether a particular attribute may 
matter more or less in different contexts. 
 
28 See Gompers, Ishii & Metrick, supra note 8, at 146-47. 
29 Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 114-15 (Del. Ch. 2011) 
illustrates the barriers presented by the combination of a staggered board and a poison pill. 
In Air Products, Chancellor Chandler remarked that the record reflected that no hostile 
bidder had ever continued its offer for two successive proxy fights. See Lucian Arye 
Bebchuk, John C. Coates, IV & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful Antitakeover Effect of 
Staggered Boards: Further Findings and  a Reply to Symposium Participants, 55 STAN. L. 
REV. 885, 888-901 (2002) (explaining interaction of staggered board and 
poison pill). 
30 The six attributes are staggered boards, limits on shareholder amendments to the 
bylaws, supermajority requirements for shareholder approval of charter amendments, and 
supermajority requirements for shareholder approval of mergers, poison pills, and golden 
parachutes. See Bebchuk, Cohen & Ferrell, supra note 8, at 796. 
31 See id. at 796 (“[T]he level of the ‘entrenchment index’ for any given firm is 
calculated by giving one point for each of the six components of the index that the firm 
has.”); Gompers, Ishii & Metrick, supra note 8, at 114 (“[F]or every firm we add one point 
for every provision that restricts shareholder rights.”) 
32 See Bebchuk, Cohen & Ferrell, supra note 8, at 796; Gompers, Ishii & Metrick, supra 
note 8, at 114. 
33 See Bebchuk, Cohen & Ferrell, supra note 8, at 796; Gompers, Ishii & Metrick, supra 
note 8, at 114. 
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B. Tobin’s Q as a Measure of Firm Value Creation 
Investors give managers initial resources to work with in the form of equity 
and debt. To the extent that the firm generates cash flow in excess of what is 
returned to investors through dividends, stock buybacks and debt service, the 
managers obtain additional resources to work with. Managers use these 
resources to make real investments. A company’s expected future cash flow 
depends on the quality of the real investment choices that the managers make 
and how well they utilize the real investments that they have chosen. The 
greater these future expected cash flows (discounted to present value), the 
more value its managers have created with the resources that have been given 
to them.  
Tobin’s Q is commonly used as a measure of how well managers have done 
in this regard. Simplifying slightly, Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the firm’s stock 
market capitalization to the book value of its assets.34 With respect to the 
numerator, the higher the market’s expectation of a firm’s discounted future 
cash flows, the greater its stock market valuation. With respect to the 
denominator, the historical cost of acquiring the firm’s real assets reflects what 
investors provided the firm in the form of equity, debt and retained cash flow, 
and is the starting point for the calculation of the firm’s book value. Thus, the 
ratio of the two is a measure of a firm’s managers’ capacity to create value 
from the resources given to them: the higher the ratio, the more value the 
market credits management for having created.35 
 
34 See Bebchuk, Cohen & Ferrell, supra note 8, at 800. More precisely, to account for 
resources obtained by debt and retained earnings financing, the typically used formula for Q 
is the market value of a firm’s equity minus the book value of the equity plus the market 
value of the firm’s debt, all divided by the book value of its assets. See Clifford W. Smith, 
Jr. & Ross L. Watts, The Investment Opportunity Set and Corporate Financing, Dividend, 
and Compensation Policies, 32 J. FIN. ECON. 263, 265-69 (1992) (explaining endogenous 
and exogenous variables requiring a specific empirical method). We follow that practice 
here. Some commentators have recently criticized the widespread use of Tobin’s Q 
measured in this fashion, advocating instead the use of “total Q,” which takes account of 
intangible assets not picked up by the traditional measure of Q. See, e.g., Robert P. Bartlett 
& Frank Partnoy, The Misuse of Tobin's Q 6-7 (Feb. 4, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3118020 [https://perma.cc/CT66-
QKQQ]. We have chosen to use the traditional measure, however, to maintain comparability 
with the earlier studies. We control for the concern over the exclusion of intangibles by 
using the firm’s R&D as a control variable. Because R&D is the primary source of 
intangibles, the concern over the impact of intangibles on using Q as a measure of 
performance is thus dealt with. In doing so, we confirm the findings of the index studies that 
there is a highly statistically significant association between firm index ratings and their 
Tobin’s Qs. 
35 We note that maximizing Tobin’s Q is not equivalent to maximizing value creation, 
i.e., maximizing the value of the expected cash flow from the firm’s real investment projects 
over the cost of implementing these projects. Ex ante, a value maximizing firm must 
identify value creating real investment projects and then should implement every real 
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C. Testing the Relationship Between G and E Index Ratings and Tobin’s Q 
The claimed link between the G and E indices’ measure of governance 
quality and corporate performance has been empirically tested in the following 
manner. First, the index scores of a large number of U.S. firms are calculated 
over a significant number of years, the length of the total period typically 
determined simply by the number of years for which data is available.36 
Similarly, Tobin’s Q is determined for each of these firms for each of these 
years.37 This creates a few thousand firm-year observations. Econometric 
techniques are then used to determine whether, based on these observations, 
firms with better governance scores on average created more value with the 
resources given them by investors than firms with worse scores.38 The G and E 
index studies each show a strong, statistically significant relationship between 
a favorable governance index score and a firm’s value creation as measured by 
Tobin’s Q.39 These findings are confirmed by our own results40 and repeatedly 
by other scholars.41 
 
investment project proposal that is expected to add more to the value of the firm than the 
cost of assets needed to implement it. If, however, a firm with an already high Tobin’s Q 
took as its goal the maximization of Tobin’s Q, it would not proceed with a proposed project 
where the ratio of the value it adds to the firm over the cost of the assets to implement it is 
lower than the firm’s current Q even where this proposed project’s ratio is positive, i.e., 
where the addition to value exceeds the cost of the needed resources. Tobin’s Q is still, 
however, a reasonable way of looking at a period of time to see which firms on average did 
better at creating value and which did worse. It is widely used in this fashion because it is 
hard to create a test that identifies both the capacity of management to identify the greatest 
value-creating projects and the willingness to go just to the margin, i.e., to implement all of 
the expected value-increasing projects and none of the expected value-decreasing projects. 
Growth in share price is not a reliable measure, for example, because the initial price 
already incorporates the market’s then-current assessment of management’s capacity to find 
value-creating projects and willingness to implement them just up to the margin. Where the 
question under study is the effect of a particular corporate governance provision on firm 
generation of value, something amenable to testing by an event study, endogeneity issues 
often arise. In other words, did the adoption of the provision result in a change in value or 
did some other circumstance that affects value induce the adoption of the provision? 
36 See, e.g., Bebchuk, Cohen & Ferrell, supra note 8, at 796.   
37 See id. at 800. 
38 See id. at 801-03 (explaining regressions used to compare index results and Tobin’s 
Q). 
39 See Bebchuk, Cohen & Ferrell, supra note 8, at 823 (E index score is negatively 
correlated to Tobin’s Q rating); Gompers, Ishii & Metrick, supra note 8, at 144 (G index is 
negatively correlated to Tobin’s Q rating). 
40 See infra Part III.E. 
41 Karpoff, Schonlau & Wehrly, supra note 13, reviews this literature. 
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II. THE SIGNALING HYPOTHESIS: THEORY 
Our signaling hypothesis is that a change in a firm’s governance structure as 
measured by the G and E indices can be a credible signal of the quality of its 
managers—their capacity to create value—and that this signal is stronger in 
situations where there is greater information asymmetry between insiders and 
the market concerning management quality. In this part, we explore the 
reasoning behind our hypothesis. We then test this hypothesis empirically in 
Part III. 
A. Three Theories Explaining the Observed Relationship Between a 
Favorable Index Rating and Value Creation 
Three possible (and clearly not mutually exclusive) theories predict the 
observed relationship between a firm’s governance rating and its Tobin’s Q. 
One is that a governance structure with a better rating leads over time to a firm 
having higher quality managers than if it had a structure with an inferior rating: 
corporation governance structures with better ratings serve as a filter to select 
better quality managers. A second theory is that managers, regardless of their 
skills, are better motivated and informed when operating under a more highly 
rated governance structure. Under the first theory, a better rated structure 
causes better managers to be chosen; under the second, it makes those chosen 
perform better whatever their skill level. [THE NEXT SENTENCE SHOULD 
BE PART OF THIS PARAGRAPH]he third theory, and our focus in this 
Article, reverses the direction of causation: a firm’s governance structure can 
be a credible signal of the quality of its managers.  
All three theories plausibly help explain the relationship between 
governance ratings and Tobin’s Q, but, for reasons discussed below, the 
signal’s impact will be particularly strong when a rating-altering change in 
structure, whether positive or negative, occurs in a context involving greater 
information asymmetry concerning management quality. This third theory 
gains empirical support from our empirical findings reported in Part III.  
1. Filtering for Manager Quality 
The first explanation is that over time a highly-rated governance structure 
does a better job at filtering out bad managers through monitoring and 
discipline than does a poorly rated structure.42 The result is that over time a 
firm with a better governance structure chooses better managers, who create 
more value because they make better decisions concerning both new 
investment projects and how to utilize the firm’s existing productive 
 
42 See Gompers, Ishii & Metrick, supra note 8, at 131 (proposing the inverse 
explanation—that low-rated governance structures cause inefficient operation and difficulty 
replacing bad managers). 
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capacity.43 Thus, they create more shareholder value, which will be reflected in 
a higher Tobin’s Q.44  
2. Better Incentivized and Informed Managers 
A second explanation for the governance structure-performance link is that a 
highly rated governance structure may provide greater incentives for a firm’s 
CEO and other managers to make the right decisions. That is, whatever the 
quality of a firm’s managers, a highly rated governance structure causes these 
managers to make better decisions. For example, a governance structure that 
makes a firm more open to hostile takeovers provides managers greater 
incentive to perform well (and vice versa). This is because the alternative—
performing poorly—is more likely to result in their losing their jobs. 
A highly rated governance structure also may provide information and voice 
to others—for example, to independent directors or activist shareholders, who 
can improve the quality of firm decision-making through, respectively, 
monitoring of management’s decision-making or providing directors 
information that otherwise might not be available to them.45 To illustrate, the 
recent phenomenon of activist investors providing companies with a detailed 
alternative strategic plan, often set out in a (very) large PowerPoint deck, may 
give boards, managers and the market information that they otherwise would 
not have because of the cost of undertaking a detailed strategic review.46 Fewer 
structural barriers to a tender offer or proxy contest, which translate into a 
better governance rating under the G and E indices, provide an incentive for 
activists to make the effort. Operating decisions based on better information, 
and the imposition of discipline on the decision-making process, should result 
in better decisions that lead to greater shareholder value by more and less 
talented managers alike.  
 
43 See id. 
44 From this perspective, the six entrenchment attributes that compose the E index are a 
last line of defense. Really good governance acts internally through devices such as a 
requirement that a majority of the board be independent, resulting in bad managers being 
weeded out before outsiders can observe the opportunity for improvement. These six 
entrenchment attributes, which facilitate capital market policing of management, serve as a 
subsequent backstop if the other devices fail. 
45 See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Agency Capitalism: Further Implications 
of Equity Intermediation, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER POWER 42-43 
(Jennifer G. & Randall S. Thomas eds., 2015) [hereinafter Gilson & Gordon, Equity 
Intermediation] (activist investors as key providers of information and proposals for 
strategic changes); Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency 
Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. 
REV. 863,  872 (2013). 
46 See Gilson & Gordon, Equity Intermediation, supra note 45, at 42 (stating that the 
more thorough and compelling activist investor proposals are, the more seriously they are 
taken). 
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3. Signaling Management Quality 
Each of the first two explanations—more effectively filtering out bad 
managers and better motivating, monitoring, and informing managers of all 
ability levels—directly affects the quality of firm decision-making; it is this 
direct increase in decision quality that results in the higher Tobin’s Q. In turn, 
worse governance protects bad managers and resuts in worse performance. 
The third possible explanation for the observed relationship between good 
corporate governance index scores and highert Tobin’s Qs is the signaling 
theory that is at the center of our empirical analysis.47 As previously described, 
a signaling theory involves a very different mechanism than the first two.48 
Instead of a higher-rated governance structure leading to higher quality 
managers as in the first theory, or influencing the performance of managers of 
all ability levels as in the second theory, the direction of causation in the third 
theory is reversed. Under this theory, high quality managers choose a highly 
rated governance structure for their firm—one that does not protect them—
because doing so shows that they have less to fear than do the low quality 
managers from the structure’s lower level of protection from capital market 
discipline and greater monitoring of other kinds. In turn, the change to a lower 
rated governance structure provides negative information about managers’ 
quality. The governance structure chosen, which is observable by the market, 
thus conveys information about management quality, something that is not 
directly observable.  
B. Exploring the Signaling Hypothesis 
Our signaling hypothesis is that a change in a firm’s governance structure 
can be a credible signal of managerial quality and that this signal is stronger in 
periods when there is a greater asymmetry of information concerning 
management quality between the firm’s insiders and the market. This 
hypothesis rests on the fact that managers play a major role in shaping the 
governance structures to which they are subject because changes in these 
structures usually come at their initiative.49 Under this hypothesis, their choice 
of a governance structure—whether one that is better rated or more poorly 
rated—provides the market with credible information about a value-relevant, 
but not fully observable, firm characteristic: management quality.  
1. The Information Asymmetry Between the Market and Corporate 
Insiders Concerning Management Quality 
To see the value of a credible signal concerning management quality, 
consider what other characteristics are available to help the market assess 
management quality. Managers’ education and experience are observable, but 
 
47 See infra Part III (testing signaling theory). 
48 See supra Introduction (introducing signaling theory). 
49 See Gompers, Ishii & Metrick, supra note 8, at 107. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3447941 
  
116 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:ppp 
 
they are noisy predictors of future performance.50 Past firm performance is also 
observable, but it too is a noisy measure of management quality because a 
cacophony of other elements combine with management quality to affect firm 
performance in any given year.51 These other elements include external factors 
such as overall industry demand, the success of the firm’s competitors and, 
importantly, simple luck. While on average good past performance indicates 
high quality management, it does not necessarily mean this in any particular 
case, especially in the short run when, as noted, good luck and good judgment 
can combine in proportions that are difficult for the market to observe.52 
2. How Corporate Governance Can Act as a Credible Signal to Reduce 
Information Asymmetry 
A firm’s managers have in the first instance a much better sense of their 
own quality than does the market. The question is how a change in governance 
structure can signal this information to the market. The analysis differs 
depending on whether the change is to a better- or worse-rated structure.  
High quality managers would like to communicate this information of their 
quality to the market. Doing so directly—say announcing that “we are high 
quality”—is not very credible, however.53 Talk is cheap and therefore it is just 
as easy for low-quality managers to say the same thing. Managers (like the rest 
of us) often do not disclaim responsibility for good performance or accept it for 
bad performance. 
For high quality managers, the signal that is needed is some indirect 
evidence of managerial quality—that would be costlier for a low quality 
manager to undertake than a high quality one. The fact that this positive signal 
is costlier for a low quality manager is what makes it credible: because of the 
higher cost, low quality managers are less likely to send the signal.54  
A firm’s governance structure, we argue, can constitute just such a signal. 
Our hypothesis as to why is as follows. The market knows that managers play 
 
50 Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q.J. ECON. 355, 356-58 (1973) (developing 
signaling concept). 
51 See id. at 356-60. 
52 Id. 
53 See Bengt R. Holmstrom & Jean Tirole, The Theory of the Firm, in 1 HANDBOOK OF 
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 82 (Richard L. Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989) 
(stating that managers cannot effectively communicate the value of a project by simply 
stating their view). 
54 The seminal article concerning signaling theory is Spence, supra note 50, at 355 
(analyzing signaling theory in context of job markets). It was first applied in the context of 
dealing with adverse selection in capital markets in Stephen A. Ross, Disclosure Regulation 
in Financial Markets: Implications of Modern Finance Theory and Signaling Theory, in 
ISSUES IN FINANCIAL REGULATION 177 (Franklin R. Edwards ed., 1979) (discussing 
applicability of signaling theory in context of financial markets). See also John G. Riley, 
Silver Signals: Twenty-Five Years of Screening and Signaling, 39 J. ECON. LIT. 432, 433-36, 
467-73 (2001) (providing background on signaling theory and its applications in finance). 
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a major role in shaping the governance structure to which they are subject. It 
also knows that when a bad manager is subject to a governance structure that 
exposes her to greater capital market discipline and other monitoring, she faces 
a greater risk of losing her job than does a good manager subject to the same 
governance structure. Therefore, it would be costlier for a bad manager to 
choose such a structure than for a good manager to do so. The G and E indices 
assign better governance ratings to governance structures that result in greater 
capital market discipline and other monitoring.55 Thus, a change to a more 
highly rated governance structure is a positive signal that the managers believe 
they are of good quality. It would be costlier for bad managers to make such a 
change: it would increase the bad managers’ risk of job loss more than the 
same change would increase the good managers’ job-loss risk. 
The signalling analysis is different, and easier, when the signal is a negative 
one: a change to a lower rated governance structure. Firm managers who are 
doing a poor job are also likely to know more about how poorly they are doing 
than does the market. Fearing, for example, that potential acquirers or activist 
hedge funds will soon figure out what a poor job they are doing, managers 
make changes in their governance structures that provide more protection 
against a potential takeover, an action that worsens their index ratings.56 In this 
situation, the change in governance structure sends a negative signal 
concerning management quality to the market that is credible on its face. Firms 
with better managers will be less inclined to make such a change because they 
are in less need of the protection. In other words, better managers are not 
inclined to “jam” the negative signal associated with a lower scoring 
governance structure.57 Again, a negative signal is inherently credible because 
good managers have no reason to falsely present themselves as poor managers. 
 The credible signal arising from a change to either a more or less favorably 
rated governance structure is information that affects the company’s stock 
price, which in turn moves the company’s Tobin’s Q.58 
This kind of signaling theory has important antecedents in the corporate 
governance and finance literature concerning how capital structure decisions 
can serve as signals.59 The logic underlying a positive signal through a capital 
 
55 See Bebchuk, Cohen & Ferrell, supra note 8, at 788-95; Gompers, Ishii & Metrick, 
supra note 8, at 114-19. 
56 See Gompers, Ishii & Metrick, supra note 8, at 108-10 (noting that managers often 
impose defensive governance measures when they fear hostile takeover bids or other 
challenges). 
57 See Riley, supra note 54, at 457 (discussing “signal jamming,” whereby an 
uninformed party is aware of an informed party’s signal equilibrium strategy). 
58 See Bebchuk, Cohen & Ferrell, supra note 8, at 785 (finding that unfavorable 
entrenching governance provisions correlate with lower firm valuation); Gompers, Ishii & 
Metrick, supra note 8, at 107 (finding that defensive corporate governance provisions 
correlate strongly with stock price). 
59 See, e.g., Holmstrom & Tirole, supra note 53, at 78-86 (discussing managers’ 
incentives and signals gleaned from their actions in context of capital structure decisions). 
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structure decision is that an increase in debt increases the risk of bankruptcy.60 
Bankruptcy, in turn, is costly to managers: the value of their job-related human 
capital, which is not diversified, is reduced if the company fails and they lose 
their jobs.61 For any given level of debt, bankruptcy is less likely for good 
managers than bad managers, so when managers increase the amount of debt in 
their company’s capital structure, they credibly signal their own quality. The 
signal would be too costly to bad managers for it to be in their interest to 
fake.62 
3. The Noisiness of the Signal and Relative Reliability of Other 
Information 
Although a change in a firm’s corporate governance structure can serve as a 
negative or positive signal of managerial quality, the signal is noisy 
information.63 In part, this is because many other factors also play a role in 
determining a particular firm’s governance structure. Moreover, as the index 
study critics argue, some attributes scored in the indices may in fact have no 
impact on firm performance.64 Accordingly, if one firm, simply because of its 
scores with respect to such non-impactful attributes, has a better rating than 
another firm, this would not mean that the first firm is any better at value 
creation. Of course, if the first firm had a better (worse) rating due to 
differences in the attributes that do have impact, the rating would properly 
suggest a greater (lesser) capacity at value creation.65 
These sources of noise, however, do not entirely eliminate the information 
content of governance structures that earn different ratings. A firm’s rating on 
average does say something about the quality of its management, but in a noisy 
way.66 To combat these noise problems, scholars use large samples, where 
other effects tend to cancel each other out, as well as control variables.67 As 
discussed in Part I, repeated tests show there is a relation between a firm’s 
index rating and measures of its value creation, a relationship confirmed by our 
own findings.68 Thus our hypothesis is not that the differently scored 
 
60 See id. 
61 See id. at 94-95. 
62 See id. at 78-86 (examining broad array of signals communicated to shareholders when 
managers adjust capital structure). 
63 See Bebchuk, Cohen & Ferrell, supra note 8, at 799 (arguing that governance indices 
contain significant amounts of “noise”). 
64 See Coates, supra note 11, at 283-86 (contending that adoption of poison pill has no 
effect on firm value). 
65 See Klausner, supra note 10, at 1363 (noting that “each noncausal element in the index 
introduces a hook for spurious correlation or correlation with no potential causation”). 
66 See Bebchuk, Cohen & Ferrell, supra note 10, at 799. 
67 See Gompers, Ishii & Metrick, supra note 8, at 110-14 (justifying noise produced by 
large data set used in study). 
68 See infra Part III.E. 
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governance structures result in what economists call a separating 
equilibrium—that they make entirely observable the differences in quality 
between competing management teams. Rather, we require only that they 
provide the market credible but otherwise unavailable information even if the 
signal is noisy.  
For a non-directly-observable feature such as managerial quality, the less 
reliable the information concerning the feature apart from the signal, the 
greater is the value of the information contained in an even very noisy signal. 
So, we posit that the increased information asymmetry concerning 
management quality associated with the Millennial accounting scandals made 
the signal associated with a firm’s governance structure, though still noisy, 
more valuable. In other words, these scandals lowered the market’s confidence 
in all companies’ financial statements and so when this other information is 
viewed as less reliable than it would be in normal times, the signal sent by a 
firm that changes its governance structure would have more of an effect than 
usual on a firm’s share price and hence on its Tobin’s Q.69 This is confirmed 
by our findings reported in Part III.70 Similarly, we would expect that this 
signal would be of more value with types of firms where as a general matter 
the information asymmetry concerning the quality of management is greater, 
for example, firms with high R&D spending. Our findings reported in Part III 
support this hypothesis as well.  
As is by now apparent, the power of a signal is not simply a function of the 
signal’s credibility in the abstract—its own signal to noise ratio.71 Rather, the 
credibility, and therefore the impact, of a governance signal depends centrally 
on context—the level of noise absent the signal. This idea finds support in 
recent efforts to assess the value of a potential, but very noisy signal relating to 
different aspect of corporate performance. Professors Amiraslani, Lins, 
Servaes, and Tamayo sought to test the link between a company’s 
trustworthiness—a form of management quality—and its access to the bond 
market.72 Because a company’s trustworthiness is not directly observable, it 
 
69 See infra Part III.A (discussing millennial accounting scandals). 
70 See infra Part III. 
71 It should be noted, however, that some of the governance structure changes are in fact 
not all that noisy. For example, the most common action that changed a company’s index 
score during the scandal period was the adoption of a “clear day” poison pill—one that is 
not a response to an immediate threat of a hostile tender offer or other control change. See 
infra Part III.E.5. This is a pretty clear negative signal of management quality because 
managers lack reasonable incentives to adopt a pill in the absence of a threat of a hostile 
offer or an activist investor initiating a proxy fight. High-quality managers would have no 
incentive to “jam” the signal—to pretend that they have the negatively signaled 
characteristic—because a high-quality manager would not take a governance action that 
suggests that she is less talented than can otherwise be observed. 
72 Hani Amiraslani et al., The Bond Market Benefits of Corporate Social Capital 6 
(European Corp. Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 535/2017, 2018), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2978794 [https://perma.cc/J7FW-QJJG]. 
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was measured by a signal: a firm’s environmental, social and governance 
expenditures, i.e., its level of “corporate social responsibility” activity 
expenditures (“CSR”).73 Socially responsible companies, the authors 
hypothesized, are more trustworthy—less likely to take advantage of lenders 
when circumstances, like the financial crisismade doing so possible. Its bond 
market access was measured by secondary market bond spreads.74 Over their 
full sample period of 2005 through 2013, the authors find no statistically 
significant relation between corporate bond spreads and this CSR measure.75 
This is hardly surprising; the literature is clear that the various CSR measures 
in use are, to put it kindly, very noisy signals as to managerial 
trustworthiness.76  
The results are strikingly different, however, for the August 2008 through 
March 2009 sub-period within the full sample period, the months constituting 
the height of the financial crisis.77 The authors report that their “results are 
unambiguous: during the [financial-crisis-induced] crisis of trust, secondary 
market credit spreads of high CSR firms did not rise as much as the spreads of 
low-CSR firms.”78 They “conclude that corporate social capital [as measured 
by CSR] affects bond contracting and pricing when it matters most: when there 
is a crisis of trust and bondholders seek reassurance that they will not be 
expropriated.”79 In other words, there was a great increase in interest 
concerning companies’ trustworthiness because the crisis created an 
opportunity for untrustworthy firms to disadvantage their lenders.80 Under 
these circumstances, information concerning the trustworthiness of a firm’s 
management became sufficiently more valuable that CSR scores, despite their 
 
73 See id. at 4. 
74 Id. at 11. 
75 See id. at 13-15. 
76 For example, CASEY O’CONNOR & SARAH LABOWITZ, N.Y.U. STERN CTR. OF BUS. & 
HUMAN RIGHTS, PUTTING THE “S” IN ESG: MEASURING HUMAN RIGHTS PERFORMANCE FOR 
INVESTORS 16-25 (2017), demonstrates the difficulty in constructing a reliable rating system, 
focusing on the social component of ESG, assessing twelve existing measurement 
techniques. Given the range of factors necessary to construct a rating structure, and the fact 
that different investors will weigh different ESG factors differently, it is not surprising that 
that there are many ratings systems. A recent study prepared for the Department of Labor 
and addressed to pension funds reviews the literature. OGECHUKWU EZEOKOLI ET AL., 
SUMMIT CONSULTING, LLC, ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND GOVERNANCE (ESG) 
INVESTMENT TOOLS: A REVIEW OF THE CURRENT FIELD 35-38 (2017). 
77 See Amiraslani et al., supra note 72, at 16-20 (analyzing CSR and credit spreads 
during financial crisis). 
78 Id. at 6. 
79 Id. 
80 See id. 
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very considerable noisiness, became reflected in the market in a statistically 
significant way.81 
This pattern matches our results with respect to the Millennium accounting 
crisis: corporate governance changes operate as a powerful signal of 
management quality in just those circumstances when uncertainty over 
management quality is highest, and so the value relevance of additional 
information conveyed by governance changes outweighs its noise. It has 
significantly less impact, however in the periods before and after the crisis.82 
This does not mean that the signal becomes less noisy; rather, we posit that the 
value of the signal goes up because the increased information asymmetry with 
regard to managerial quality makes a governance structure change more 
valuable as a signal despite its noise.83 
4. The Value of a Governance Structure Change as a Signal 
Recognizing how the impact of the governance signal, though noisy, went 
up during the period of increased information asymmetry accompanying the 
millennium accounting scandals helps elucidate one other factor in our 
account: we would expect that a change in governance structure resulting in a 
particular rating represents a more valuable signal concerning managerial 
quality than is a continuation of a structure with that same rating from prior 
periods. In contrast to the other two theories linking index scores with Tobin’s 
Q—filtering and incentives/informedness—the signaling theory does not 
concern how the governance structure affects the value creation capacity of the 
firm.84 Rather, in this third theory, the value creation capacity of the firm is 
taken as given.85 The problem is that this value creation capacity is not fully 
understood by the market.86 One important but not-fully-understood factor 
affecting the firm’s value creation capacity is the quality of the firm’s 
management. The firm’s governance structure provides information 
concerning this factor. 
 
81 Two recent papers show a similar contextual relationship between governance and 
performance using an empirical design similar to ours. Karl V. Lins, Henri Servaes & Ane 
Tamayo, Social Capital, Trust and Firm Performance during the Financial Crisis, 72 J FIN. 
1785 (2017), and Mattawut Jenwittayaroje & Pornsit Jiraporn, Do Independent Directors 
Improve Firm Value? Evidence from the Great Recession, 19 INT’L REV. FIN. 207 (2019), 
examined whether two different governance characteristics—the presence of independent 
directors and a firm’s social capital—affected the firm’s performance. Both found that these 
governance characteristics had a positive and statistically significant impact on firm 
performance during the financial crisis, when stress reduced the value of existing 
information, but had no impact outside the crisis period. See Lins, Servaes & Tamayo, 
supra, at 1788; Jenwittayaroje, supra, at 211. 
82 See infra Part III.E. 
83 See infra Part III.E.  
84 See supra Part II.B.1-2. 
85 See supra Part II.B.3. 
86 See id. 
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The quality of a firm’s management can change from time to time, 
sometimes substantially. Turnover in management personnel is one potential 
source of such quality change. But a change in quality can happen as well 
without a personnel change. For example, the perspectives of the incumbent 
personnel can become outmoded, and this can sometimes happen quite rapidly 
in a dynamic economy in which the management skills necessary to success 
can be subject to sudden dramatic shifts. Most notably, Professor Clayton 
Christensen’s influential explanation for sharp disruptions in the success of 
industry leaders highlights just this point.87 In its current popular sense, the 
term “disruption” reflects the capacity of a new idea, most familiarly deployed 
by a new company, to fundamentally alter the structure of a product market to 
the advantage of the newcomer over the incumbent leaders in that market. 
Managers whose skills fit well the prior competitive environment do not fit the 
new one; effective management quality drops without either a change in 
managerial personnel or a change in their current skills. Indeed, where a new 
competency is required, existing management’s tried-and-true experience 
actually may be a disadvantage; they must first unlearn the old ways of 
thinking and doing things before they can learn the new ways.88 
Because managerial quality in this sense—management “fit” may be a better 
term here—can change quite suddenly and at the same time is not directly 
observable, there will, at any point in time, be a high level of information 
asymmetry as to whether such a quality change has occurred recently and if so 
the extent of the change. Over time, this asymmetry is reduced as performance 
results accumulate and become more reliable indicators of whether, at that 
earlier point, there in fact had been a change in quality.  
Against this background, it is apparent why a governance structure change 
resulting in a given new rating represents a more valuable signal concerning 
the current quality of management than is the continuation of a governance 
structure that receives this same rating. Suppose that in a hypothetical Period 1 
there is an index rating altering change in a firm’s governance structure. The 
high level of information asymmetry concerning whether or not there has been 
a recent change in the firm’s management quality gives value to the signal 
coming from the governance structure change. Still, this is a noisy signal. In 
other words, on average it suggests something about a change in managerial 
 
87 CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA: WHEN NEW TECHNOLOGIES 
CAUSE GREAT FIRMS TO FAIL 207-10 (1997) (exploring challenges companies face in the 
event of rapid change in industry technology). 
88 Rebecca Henderson, The Innovator’s Dilemma as a Problem of Organizational 
Competence, 23 J. PROD. INNOVATION MGMT. 5, 6-10 (2006), provides a useful survey of 
alternative mechanisms that may give rise to a reduction in management quality without a 
change in the persons constituting management or in their existing skills. For a description 
of the difficulty that the mainline electronics firms had in recognizing the potential of 
semiconductors, which subsequently became the heart of the whole information technology 
revolution, see MERRITT B. FOX, FINANCE AND INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE IN A DYNAMIC 
ECONOMY: THEORY, PRACTICE AND POLICY 290-97 (1987). 
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quality but, in any individual case, there well may not have been such a change 
in quality. Over time, more information arrives as to whether this signal 
correctly indicated a change in managerial quality during, or recently prior to, 
Period 1. Thus, in Period 2, the information asymmetry diminishes concerning 
whether in fact a managerial quality change did occur during, or recently prior 
to, Period 1. In Period 3 it diminishes further, and so on. Generalizing, a firm 
that is continuing its same governance structure during the current period is 
one that adopted this structure in some prior period, quite possibly many 
periods back. This means that the fact that a firm adopted a particular 
governance structure at some point in the past and did not change during the 
current period (i.e., that it is continuing its already establishd governance 
structure) has less value in revealing to the market the quality of the firm’s 
management today than would a current-period change to this same structure.  
III. TESTING THE SIGNALING HYPOTHESIS 
The three theories addressing the observed relationship between firms with 
more highly rated governance structures and Tobin’s Q are not by their terms 
mutually exclusive. The existing studies that show this relationship, however, 
do not allow us to distinguish whether one, two or all three of the theories in 
fact are at work.89 Here we begin to sort this question out by showing that, at 
least under the right circumstances, the signaling hypothesis is consistent with 
powerful empirical results. The other two theories may also help explain the 
relationship––indeed we think that this is likely—but our findings fairly 
definitively show that at least the third theory is at work. 
Our starting point is a time period when the market was unusually uncertain 
about the quality of the managements of individual U.S. firms and so new 
information concerning management quality was especially value relevant.90 
According to our hypotheses, if we observe firms that changed their 
governance index ratings during such a period experienced larger changes in 
Tobin’s Q than did firms that made similar changes in other years, signaling 
was likely to have been at work. The idea is straightforward: if an action has a 
bigger effect on stock prices, and hence Tobin’s Q, in periods when the market 
is otherwise less informed, the action must be something that provides 
information to the market. As documented below, the three-year period 2000-
2002 was otherwise less informed. During this period, the United States was 
rocked by a series of corporate accounting scandals affecting large respected 
firms. These scandals called into question the reliability of the earnings reports 
of all the nation’s public companies and hence of the market’s assessments of 
management quality of all these firms. The market reasonably wondered 
whether there were more shoes still to drop that would reveal as low quality 
additional managers previously thought to be capable.  
 
89 See Bebchuk, Cohen & Ferrell, supra note 8, at 823 (reporting correlation but 
declining to put forward theory of causation). 
90 See infra Part III.A. 
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We report two key findings with respect to this period. First, the impact on 
the Tobin’s Qs of firms that changed their structures in 2000-2002 was 
substantially greater than for firms that changed their structures in the twelve 
years surrounding this period.91 Second, the overall relation between firm 
index ratings and Tobin’s Q, measured across all firms (which includes the 
vast majority that did not change their governance structures), is not 
significantly different during 2000-2002 than in the other twelve years. This 
second finding suggests that the market did not think that a governance 
structure with a higher rating was any more effective at creating extra value 
during the scandal period than in normal times, or at least not sufficiently more 
effective to generate a statistically significant difference. In other words, the 
second finding shows there is no significant evidence that either of the first two 
theories explaining the positive relation between good governance ratings and 
Tobin’s Q—filtering out bad managers or better incentivizing and informing 
managers generally—was working differently in the 2000-2002 period than in 
other years.  
This leaves the third explanation, signaling, to explain why governance 
changes in the 2000-2002 period had a markedly greater impact on Tobin’s Q 
than in the surrounding twelve years. If signaling does in part explain the 
relationship between governance ratings and firm value, one would expect to 
see a bigger effect when there is more doubt about the subject of the signal—
managerial quality. This is exactly what we see.92  
 
91 See infra Part III.E. 
92 This story can be refined, but the basic message remains unchanged. During the 2000-
2002 period, the economy experienced three other significant events beyond the wave of 
accounting scandals: the Dot Com bust as reflected in the March 2001 NASDAQ market 
crash; the beginning of a recession in March 2001; and the September 11, 2001, World 
Trade Center terrorist attacks. These kinds of event-driven pressures on a firm’s business 
environment raise questions about existing strategies and generally disrupt business as 
usual. By increasing the choices confronting a company, such an event should make the 
quality of management more important. See Edward G. Fox, Merritt B. Fox & Ronald J. 
Gilson, Economic Crisis and the Integration of Law and Finance: The Impact of Volatility 
Spikes, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 325, 344 (2016). If, as we would expect, management quality 
became more important to the market in 2001-2002, we would expect an accentuation of the 
effects of good ratings on Tobin’s Q that are at the heart of the first two theories. Our 
second finding—that the overall relation between firm index ratings and Tobin’s Q, 
measured across all firms, is not significantly different during 2000-2002 than in the other 
twelve years—means that we do not have empirical support for that expectation. This could 
mean that our tests lack the power to detect the accentuation that we would expect, rather 
than that it did not occur. The important point is that tests with similar power are behind our 
first finding of a large increase in the impact on Tobin’s Q from firms that changed structure 
when comparing the 2000-2002 period to the other twelve years. So, these other events in 
the economy and their effects on the workings of the first two theories cannot explain much 
of our first finding, which leaves the third theory—signaling—as the likely explanation. 
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A. The Millennial Accounting Fraud Scandals 
The 2000-2002 period was special in U.S. corporate history because of the 
unprecedented cascade of accounting frauds that were revealed. In the years 
immediately preceding these revelations, there appears to have been a buildup, 
unknown to the market, of undisclosed frauds.93 One possible reason for this 
buildup was a proliferation of short-time-horizon share price-based executive 
compensation packages, which created greater incentives for manipulating the 
numbers as well as for genuinely better performance. Another was an apparent 
decline over the preceding years in the effectiveness of the various gatekeepers 
such as accountants, rating agencies, investment banks and lawyers, who are 
supposed to help protect capital markets against fraud.94 Warren Buffett is 
famously quoted as saying “[Y]ou only find out who is swimming naked when 
the tide goes out,”95 and the recession that hit the country shortly after the 
beginning of the new millennium seems to have made observable a buildup of 
accounting fraud. Some of the most prominent and, at the time, respected 
corporations in the country, including Enron, WorldCom, HealthSouth, and 
Adelphia, were severely damaged or destroyed by senior management 
fraudulent behavior involving material misstatements or omissions about firm 
performance in the company’s financial statements.96 Each of these scandals 
warrants a brief history to show why they spread doubt across the rest of 
corporate America.97  
1. Enron 
Enron was the poster child for the phenomenon. In August 2000, Enron’s 
stock peaked at nearly ninety dollars per share and the company had been 
listed as America’s most innovative firm for five consecutive years.98 The 
 
93 See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 15-16 (2006) (reviewing the hundreds of U.S. corporations that restated 
financial statements and were sued by the SEC in 2001 and 2002). 
94 See Merritt B. Fox, Gatekeeper Failures: Why Important, What to Do, 106 MICH. L. 
REV. 1089, 1091-93 (2010) (expanding on Professor Coffee’s conception of gatekeeper 
failure by connecting such failures to broader defects in corporate governance). 
95 Letter from Warren Buffett, Chairman, Berkshire Hathway Inc., to the Shareholders of 
Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 10 (Feb. 28, 2002), 
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2001pdf.pdf [http://perma.cc/QUJ7-X8PG]. 
96 See COFFEE, supra note 93, at 15 (recounting the “stunningly complete breakdown in 
all systems of internal control and external monitoring” among many of the country’s 
prominent corporations). 
97 For an extensive list of companies faced with accounting scandals from 2001-2002, 
including Bristol-Myers Squibb, Merck, Tyco, and Xerox see Penelope Patsuris, The 
Corporate Scandal Sheet, FORBES (Aug. 26, 2002, 5:30 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/2002/07/25/accountingtracker.html [https://perma.cc/4QH4-9EFB]. 
98 William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 
1275, 1276 (2002) (“Enron flew high. When its stock price peaked at close to ninety dollars 
in August 2000, it was America’s seventh largest firm by market capitalization.”). 
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company had been repeatedly touted as having impressive management and 
among the best boards of directors.99 In a year’s time, following the revelation 
of massive fraud, Enron would enter Chapter 11 bankruptcy as the largest 
bankruptcy filing in American history.100  
Perhaps most famously, Enron sponsored hundreds of special purpose 
entities (“SPEs”) that it claimed insured it against the downside risks 
associated with many of the assets it acquired. In the typical transaction, Enron 
would inappropriately capitalize the SPE with its own stock.101 The SPE would 
provide Enron with a put, whereby Enron had the right to sell the asset to the 
SPE for a specified price.102 This arrangement had an inherent problem: if the 
value of the asset and the value of Enron stock both fell, the SPE would not 
have sufficient assets to make the purchase, at the exact moment when the 
protection of the put against downside risk would be most important.103 
Moreover, even if the SPE did manage to perform, Enron had created an 
arrangement that in effect violated a fundamental accounting principle: the 
proceeds from the issuance of new equity should not be counted as earnings.104 
Investors in Enron were unaware of the endogenous nature of these SPE 
arrangements.105 
Enron “stretched the limits of accounting”106 in other ways as well. Enron 
valued certain of its varied assets on a “mark-to-market” basis in a way that 
allowed the company to recognize as current income what was really just 
forecasted future income on a long-term contract.107 In July 2000, for example, 
Enron entered into a twenty-year partnership with Blockbuster Inc. to develop 
a company that would provide films to customers through Enron’s fiber-optic 
 
99 See Jeffrey A. Sonnenfeld, What Makes Great Boards Great, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept. 
2002, at 106, 108 (“[N]o corporation could have had more appropriate financial 
competencies and experience on its board [than Enron].”). Less than a year before the 
company declared bankruptcy, Fortune Magazine ranked Enron second in “quality of 
management” among all U.S. corporations. See COFFEE, supra note 93, at 18 (outlining 
Enron’s six-year stretch of winning “every conceivable award”). 
100 Bratton, supra note 98, at 1276. 
101 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Enron and the Use and Abuse of Special Purpose Entities in 
Corporate Structures, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1309, 1310 (2002) (explaining Enron’s method of 
relying on rising stock prices to avoid paying guarantees on SPE value). 
102 Id. 
103 See id. at 1315-16 (explaining how Enron’s securitization failed to effectively shift 
risk to SPEs, because they were capitalized solely with Enron stock). 
104 See Paul M. Healy & Krishna G. Palepu, The Fall of Enron, 17 J. ECON. PERSP., 
Spring 2003, at 3, 10-11 (listing the multiple ways in which Enron shirked accounting rules 
and principles). 
105 See id. at 11 (stating that, while investors were aware of SPEs’ existence, they were 
not aware that SPEs were guaranteed entirely with Enron stock). 
106 Id. at 9 (stating that Enron reported as current earnings contracts extending decades 
into future). 
107 Id. at 10 (explaining large “Project Braveheart” deal between Enron and Blockbuster). 
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cables.108 Enron assigned a $124.8 million value to the partnership based on its 
projection of future revenues and, based on these long-run expected profits, 
reported an additional $53 million in current earnings in the last quarter of 
2000 and $58 million in the first quarter of 2001. In contrast, Blockbuster 
recorded no profits from the deal for those quarters.109 The partnership was 
ultimately dissolved in October 2001, and Enron had to reverse the earlier 
reported earnings.110  
Beginning in 2001, Enron’s stock began to decline for reasons unrelated to 
the accounting fraud, which had yet to be detected.111 The declining share 
price, among other things, left the SPEs with negative equity, and in October 
2001 Enron was forced to announce that it had violated a variety of accounting 
standards.112 As a result of these accounting revisions, the company restated its 
financial statements for years 1997 to 2000, reducing total earnings by $613 
million, increasing liabilities by $628 million, and removing $1.2 billion of 
shareholder equity.113 Only two months later, Enron filed for bankruptcy with 
assets of $63.4 billion, marking the largest restructuring in U.S. history.114  
Enron’s failure, and the inability of its information gatekeepers—namely the 
auditors, rating agencies, and investment banks—to detect the financial 
malfeasance115 would effectively “call[] the entire American market’s integrity 
into question.”116 Similarly, commentary at the time by prominent academics 
saw Enron as illustrative of more general problems. Healy and Palepu noted 
that “the problems of governance and incentives that emerged at Enron can 
also surface at many other firms and may potentially affect the entire capital 
market.”117 Jeffrey Gordon questioned whether “[t]he real concern is that the 
gross overreaching at Enron is symptomatic of troubling if not egregious 
behavior elsewhere.”118  
 
108 George J. Benston & Al L. Hartgraves, Enron: What Happened and What We Can 
Learn From It, 21 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 105, 116 (2002). 
109 Id. (highlighting disingenuity of Enron’s accounting practices). 
110 Id. 
111 Bratton, supra note 98, at 1322. 
112 Healy & Palepu, supra note 105, at 11. 
113 Id. 
114 Benston & Hartgraves, supra note 48, at 106. 
115 See COFFEE, supra note 93, at 15-16 (arguing that gatekeepers’ inability to detect 
wrongdoing was often caused by wilfull ignorance of “sentries upon whom investors 
relied”). 
116 Bill Mann, Outraged Over Enron, MOTLEY FOOL (Jan. 17, 2002), 
http://www.fool.com/news/foth/foth020117.htm [https://perma.cc/H3N5-LM23]. 
117 Healy & Palepu, supra note 105, at 4. 
118 Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the 
Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1249 
(2002). 
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2. WorldCom 
WorldCom’s accounting fraud was less sophisticated than Enron’s but had 
similar consequences. WorldCom’s CEO and CFO (Bernard Ebbers and Scott 
Sullivan, respectively) were widely regarded as “one of the best executive 
pairings in American business.”119 Between 1985 and 2001, WorldCom 
acquired more than seventy companies for over $100 billion. This included its 
1998 merger with MCI Communications in a transaction valued at $37 billion, 
at the time the largest merger in history.120 By 2001 it was the nation’s second 
largest long-distance telephone company and its largest provider of internet 
services.121  
WorldCom maintained its capacity to provide long distance phone service in 
part by entering into long-term leases to use the lines of other telecom firms.122 
These leases would often require WorldCom to make fixed monthly payments 
regardless of utilization. By 2000, these line costs were WorldCom’s largest 
expense item and represented nearly half of its operating costs.123 Analysts and 
commentators of the telecommunications industry focused heavily on the line 
cost expenditure-to-revenue (“E/R”) ratio as an important performance 
indicator.124 Over this period WorldCom consistently recorded an E/R ratio of 
forty-two percent, significantly lower than its competitors, a ratio that it 
struggled to maintain as market conditions tightened, and ultimately did so 
through fraud.125 
WorldCom’s accounting fraud took two principal forms—an understatement 
of its line costs and an exaggeration of its revenues—with the objectives of 
anchoring the E/R ratio at forty-two percent and reporting double-digit revenue 
growth.126 WorldCom manipulated its line costs by improperly releasing 
 
119 Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Conflicts of Interest and Corporate Governance Failures at 
Universal Banks During the Stock Market Boom of the 1990s: The Cases of Enron and 
WorldCom, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN BANKING: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 113 (Benton 
E. Gup ed., 2007). 
120 See J. Randel Kuhn, Jr. & Steve G. Sutton, Learning from WorldCom: Implications 
for Fraud Detection Through Continuous Assurance, J. EMERGING TECHS. ACCT., Dec. 
2006, at 61, 63 (stating that merged entity was so large that it controlled over half of world’s 
emails). 
121 See id. 
122 Wilmarth, supra note 119, at 114 (explaining WorldCom’s ability to scale its 
operation to such a massive size). 
123 Id. 
124 Kuhn & Sutton, supra note 120, at 63. 
125 See id. (stating that “management manipulated financial information to increase the 
appearance of revenue growth, cost reduction, and overall profit,” in order to retain 
favorable E/R ratio). 
126 DENNIS R. BERESFORD, NICHOLAS DEB. KATZENBACH & C.B. ROGERS, JR., REPORT OF 
INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF 
WORLDCOM, INC. 9 (2003), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/723527/000093176303001862/dex991.htm 
Deleted: 118
Deleted: 119
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3447941 
  
2019] THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE BLACK HOLE 129 
 
accruals set aside on its financial statements to pay anticipated bills in the 
future.127 These accounting accruals “were supposed to reflect estimates of the 
costs associated with the use of lines and other facilities of outside vendors, 
[but] for which WorldCom had not yet paid.”128 Releasing an accrual suggests, 
in this case without a sound basis, that less is needed to pay these bills than had 
been previously anticipated, thereby reducing reported expenses and increasing 
pre-tax income.129 By the end of 2000, WorldCom had exhausted these 
previously accumulated accruals.130 
Once these accruals were depleted, WorldCom shifted to other forms of 
accounting fraud.131 It capitalized, rather than expensed, $3.8 billion of the 
company’s cash outlays for line costs during 2001 and the first quarter of 
2002.132 Under generally accepted accounting principles (“GAAP”), operating 
expenses must be deducted from gross revenues to calculate earnings, whereas 
cash outlays characterized as capital are not so deducted. The theory behind 
this difference in treatment is that unlike operating expenses, the outlays 
properly characterized as capital acquire longer lasting assets that will be 
available to generate revenues in future periods. Thus, these outlays will 
instead be deducted from revenues over time as depreciation or 
amortization.133 Since these line cost outlays were in fact expenses needed to 
provide the services that generated current revenues and acquired nothing 
useful for generating future revenues, WorldCom, by capitalizing these 
outlays, was again able to inflate net income.134 Had WorldCom not 
inappropriately capitalized its line costs, it would have reported a pre-tax loss 
 
[https://perma.cc/R4HU-2UQH] (“WorldCom’s improper accounting took two principal 
forms: reduction of reported line costs, WorldCom’s largest category of expenses; and 
exaggeration of reported revenues.”). 
127 Id. at 10. 
128 Id.. 
129 Id.. 
130 Id. at 11. 
131 See id. (reporting that WorldCom shifted from accruals to capitalizing expenses 
improperly). 
132 Wilmarth, supra note 119, at 115 (recounting how WorldCom capitalized $3.8 billion 
in line costs after exhausting its available reserves in 2001). 
133 The outlays for capital assets are ultimately counted against revenue, but this is done 
in future periods in the form of deductions for depreciation that are spread over the useful 
life of the asset. Kuhn & Sutton, supra note 120, at 63-64 (restating this accounting 
principle). 
134 See BOB LYKE & MARK JICKLING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21253, WORLDCOM: 
THE ACCOUNTING SCANDAL 2-3 (2002) (observing that “capitalizing line costs would have 
enabled the company to spread its current expenses into the future”). 
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in three of the five years in which the scheme went on, and would have had 
E/R ratios consistently exceeding fifty percent.135 
WorldCom met a fate similar to Enron. The company filed bankruptcy in 
July 2002,136 ultimately issuing a final restatement that, in its correction of the 
accounting frauds, reduced its previous reported pre-tax earnings by $10.6 
billion.137 WorldCom’s CEO was sentenced to five years in prison.138 Its CFO 
also received a prison sentence and its director of general accounting and 
several of his employees pled guilty to conspiracy and securities fraud 
charges.139 As with Enron, the press response to the WorldCom scandal saw it 
as indicative of systemic failure in the quality of the financial disclosure 
provided by U.S. public corporations. In the words of The Economist at the 
time, “WorldCom may also mark the point when investors, particularly 
foreigners, finally lose all confidence in American accounting . . . .”140 
3. HealthSouth 
HealthSouth involved even cruder tactics to exaggerate earnings than did 
WorldCom.141 In order to maintain the appearance of growth, HealthSouth’s 
CEO and a group of executives would, near the end of each reporting quarter, 
pick a desired earnings-per-share figure in light of existing analyst 
expectations.142 This desired figure was then forwarded to the assistant 
controller.143 The controller would in turn work with a handful of finance and 
 
135 BERESFORD ET AL., supra note 126, at 11-12 (“Had it not capitalized line costs, 
WorldCom’s reported line cost E/R ratio would have been much higher, typically exceeding 
50%.”). 
136 Wilmarth, supra note 119, at 115. 
137 Id. 
138 Jennifer Bayot & Roben Farzad, WorldCom Executive Sentenced, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
12, 2005, at C1. 
139 Kathleen Brickley, From Enron to WorldCom and Beyond: Life and Crime After 
Sarbannes-Oxley, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 357, 372 (2003) (describing prosecution of 
WorldCom’s CFO and Director of General Accounting, along with other accounting 
officials). 
140 WorldCom and Financial Markets: Another Scandal, Another Scare, ECONOMIST, 
June 29, 2002, at 67, 67. 
141 See Carrick Mollenkamp, Missed Signal: An Accountant Tried in Vain to Expose 
HealthSouth Fraud, WALL STREET J., May 20, 2003, at A1(describing how employees 
falsified invoices to cover up larger accounting fraud). 
142 See Kenneth N. Gilpin, S.E.C. Accuses HealthSouth and Chief of Accounting Fraud, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2003), https://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/19/books/sec-accuses-
healthsouth-and-chief-of-accounting-fraud.html (describing how CEO required HealthSouth 
to “meet the quarterly earnings estimates of Wall Street analysts”). 
143 See Complaint for Injunctive and Other Relief at 17, SEC v. HealthSouth Corp., 261 
F. Supp. 2d 1298 (N.D. Ala. 2003) (No. CV-03-J-0615-S), 2003 WL 22002425 (“If HRC’s 
actual results fell short of expectations, Scrushy would tell HRC’s management to ‘fix 
it’ . . . .”). 
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accounting executives, known internally as “the family,” to plug the gap 
between desired and actual earnings.144 These executives did so by falsifying 
accounting entries for cash, inventory, and assets.145 After the fraud was 
revealed, bankruptcy ensued, and all five HealthSouth CFO’s during the period 
of the fraud pled guilty to criminal indictments.146 As with the Enron and 
WorldCom scandals, HealthSouth was said to put at issue not only the 
fabricated value of HealthSouth’s stock, but represented as well “a 
fundamental attack on the core of the public market: accurate and transparent 
pricing information.”147 
4. Adelphia 
The scandal at Adelphia included the added twist that part of the accounting 
fraud covered up significant self-dealing between Adelphia and the family that 
controlled it.148 Adelphia Communications, a publicly traded but family 
controlled cable company, had by 2002 become the sixth largest U.S. cable 
company, with annual revenues of $2.9 billion and over five and a half million 
subscribers across thirty-two states.149 As it turned out, however, Adelphia had 
been manipulating its financial reports since the company went public in 1986, 
according to the testimony of a former vice president of finance, James R. 
Brown, who pled guilty to securities fraud and bank fraud.150 Brown stated that 
he and other Adelphia officers regularly fabricated statistics on the number of 
subscribers, cash flow, cable-system upgrades, and other closely followed 
metrics.151  
Among Adelphia’s techniques were, as with WorldCom, fictitious 
conversions of cash outlays for operating expenses into outlays that could be 
 
144 See Gilpin, supra note 142 (“[S]enior in-house accounting executives responsible for 
fixing earnings shortfalls referred to meetings at which these changes were made as ‘family 
meetings’ and referred to themselves as ‘family members.’”). 
145 Mollenkamp, supra note 141 (describing how senior accounting executives falsified 
assets on balance sheets and falsified invoices to cover up the falsified assets). 
146Id. (noting that all five CFOs reached plea deals with DOJ). 
147 Ken Randall & Hunter Hill, Corporate Governance and the HealthSouth Derivative 
Litigation, 71 ALA. LAW. 129, 131 (2010) (“At issue, of course, is not only the fabricated 
value of HealthSouth’s stock, but a fundamental attack on the core of the public market: 
accurate and transparent pricing information.”). 
148 See Kristine Barlaup, Hanne Iren Drønen & Iris Stuart, Restructuring Trust in 
Auditing: Ethical Discernment and the Adelphia Scandal, 24 MANAGERIAL AUDITING 183, 
193 (2009) (describing how Rigas family used company as “personal ‘piggy bank’”). 
149 Id. at 192 (“By the time the Adelphia scandal broke in 2002, Adelphia was the sixth 
largest cable company in the United States. The annual revenue was $2.9 billion, and the 
company had 5,547,690 subscribers.”). 
150 Id. at 195 (“According to Brown, Adelphia began to manipulate their financial 
reports not long after the company had been publicly listed in 1986.”). 
151 Id. 
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capitalized.152 For example, Adelphia allegedly agreed with two suppliers of 
digital set-top boxes to overpay by $7 million for the boxes. In return, the 
suppliers agreed to provide Adelphia with an equal amount in “marketing 
support.” The additional outlay for the boxes was capitalized and thus did not 
count against earnings. The sleight of hand saved Adelphia $7 million in 
marketing expenses, boosting its reported earnings by that amount.153 The 
record suggested an overall lack of oversight of the accounting process. For 
example, the company’s audit committee met only once in 1999154 and, from 
the last half of 2000 until April of 2002, consisted of only two members, one 
outside director and a member of the controlling Rigas family.155 Finally, 
Adelphia’s accounting fraud was accompanied by extensive self-dealing by the 
Rigas family, that, of course, was not disclosed in the company’s financial 
statements.  
In April 2002, Adelphia delayed the filing of its annual 10-K report with the 
Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC”), in part due to disagreements with 
its auditor, Deloitte & Touche.156 The SEC simultaneously opened an informal 
inquiry to investigate the company’s accounting methods,157 and the company 
was forced into bankruptcy by June 2002.158 John Rigas was convicted of fraud 
and conspiracy for stealing more than $100 million in company funds and 
hiding more than $2 billion in debt incurred by the family through entities 
involving Adelphia.159 The Wall Street Journal noted that the charges brought 
by the federal government in the immediate aftermath of the fraud represented 
the latest effort “to crack down on corporate malfeasance as public confidence 
 
152 Jerry Markon & Robert Frank,  Five Adelphia Officials Arrested on Fraud Charges—
Three in the Rigas Family, Two Other Executives Held, Accused of Massive Looting, WALL 
STREET J., July 25, 2002, at A3(explaining how CEO instructed employees to create 
fictitious transactions to boost revenue). 
153 See id. (summarizing this transaction). 
154 Barlaup, Drønen & Stuart, supra note 148, at 194 (“[T]he committee met only once in 
1999, and four times in 2000.”). 
155 Id. (“From the last seven months of 2000 until April 2001, the committee consisted of 
only two members; one outside director, and Timothy Rigas, who at that time also held the 
position as financial director of Adelphia.”). 
156 Id. (“Disagreements between Adelphia and the company’s auditor, Deloitte, regarding 
the appropriate way to account for the loan agreements contributed to the delay of the 
financial report.”). 
157 Id. at 193 (“On April 2, 2002, the SEC opened an informal inquiry to investigate the 
accounting methods used by Adelphia.”). 
158 Id. at 192 (noting Adelphia filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in June 2002, after 
revelation of scandal). 
159 Peter Grant & Christine Nuzum, Adelphia Founder and One Son Are Found Guilty—
Jury Remains Deadlocked on Second Son, Acquits Former Assistant Treasurer, WALL 
STREET J., July 9, 2004, at A1 (reporting on Rigas’ conviction of fraud and conspiracy to 
loot company’s funds). 
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and the financial markets have been battered by seemingly relentless 
disclosures of financial shenanigans.”160 
5. Overview: The Situation of Investors 
Consider market participants’ situation as this cascade of scandals rained 
down. They would have a feared that other firms, as yet untarred by scandal, 
would reveal fraudulent accounting practices. This fear would call into 
question the accuracy of public information concerning the performance of all 
the still-untarred companies in the market, resulting in a serious problem. 
Market participants would have recognized there was a distribution of 
managerial quality among firms, an important firm characteristic to investors. 
But fear about the reliability of the information about each firm would raise 
questions about whether their previous assessments of management quality 
were correct, particularly because the scandals described above took place at 
some of the country’s most respected companies. Press accounts from this 
period reported that investors were coming to harbor suspicion that financial 
statements more generally were subject to fraud risk but were uncertain as to 
who were the bad actors.161 A statement by Brett Truman, an accounting 
professor from the University of California-Berkeley’s Haas School of 
Business, captures the concern: “This is why the market keeps going down 
every day - investors do not know who to trust. . . . As these things come out, it 
just continues to build up.”162 
In this circumstance, high quality firm managers would have had an 
unusually strong incentive to send a signal that that credibly conveyed to the 
market the accuracy of their financial disclosures and hence the managers’ 
quality—that their reported performance was the product of skill, not fraud.163 
In a period when the market was surprised by a pattern of fraud in respected 
exchange-listed companies, equity holders could be uncertain of their ability to 
distinguish between companies with honest managements and those that would 
resort to fraud. Accordingly, the market would discount every company for the 
chance that it was a “hidden” bad company—in signaling terms, a pooling 
equilibrium. This discounting would create a strong incentive for honest, 
 
160 Markon & Frank, supra note 152. 
161 See, e.g., WorldCom and Financial Markets: Another Scandal, Another Scare, supra 
note 140, at 67 (“WorldCom may also mark the point when investors, particularly 
foreigners, finally lose all confidence in American accounting . . . .”). 
162 See David Hancock, World-Class Scandal at WorldCom, CBS NEWS (June 26, 2002, 
9:23 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/world-class-scandal-at-worldcom/ 
[https://perma.cc/HP82-B85Y]. 
163 See Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, Corporate Financing and Investment 
Decisions When Firms Have Information That Investors Do Not Have, 13 J. FIN. ECON. 187, 
188 (1984); Lakshmi Shayam-Sunder & Stewart C. Myers, Testing Static Tradeoff Against 
Pecking Order Models of Capital Structure, 51 J. FIN. ECON. 219, 225 (1999) (discussing 
how information asymmetry between management and investors drives investment 
decisions). 
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capable managers to find ways to signal their high quality. Managers who 
succeeded in freeing themselves from suspicion by the use of such a signal 
would separate themselves from the lemons-like market pooling and so see 
their companies’ share prices rise. This would both reduce the cost of equity 
finance and provide the variety of other benefits that managers enjoy from 
higher share prices. Conversely, firms that took action that sent a negative sign 
of management quality would stand out starkly; as discussed earlier, negative 
signals are inherently credible since high quality managers would have no 
incentive to jam the signal. 
B. Overview of the Empirical Study and Its Results 
The findings that we report below strongly suggest that during the 2000-
2002 period, changes in firm governance structures did act as a signal of the 
quality of their managers. Our study employs the two broadly-used governance 
indices discussed above, the G and E indices. Treating G and E ratings, 
respectively, as the independent variable, we use a linear regression analysis to 
see what on average happens to a firm’s Tobin’s Q, the dependent variable, 
when there is a difference in the rating. For a large sample of firms for the 
years 1992-2006, we run two kinds of econometric tests described below: an 
OLS test and a fixed effects test. We then subdivide this large sample into two 
subsamples, one covering the accounting scandal years 2000-2002 and the 
other covering the surrounding twelve years (1992-1999 and 2003-2006)—and 
run the two kinds of tests on each of the subsamples. We compare the results 
for each of the tests in the three years of the governance scandal (2000-2002), 
with the results for each of the tests for all the other years in our longer period. 
1. The Nature of OLS and Fixed Effects Tests 
It is useful at the outset to briefly describe the nature of these two 
econometric tests because the signaling analysis is driven in significant part by 
the differences between them. In the OLS test, the sample being tested consists 
of the pairing of the index rating and the Tobin’s Q for each firm in the sample 
for each year that it is in the sample. The assumption is that across this sample, 
all other not-tested factors that affect the firm’s Tobin’s Q beyond the firm’s 
governance rating are randomly distributed.164 This means that, for any given 
firm in any given year, these other factors are assumed to be as likely to boost 
Q above, as to diminish Q below, what the impact of the rating on Q would 
have been if the rating were the sole factor at work. With this large sample, 
 
164 To act as a control, the regressions include, as other independent variables, several 
additional factors that might affect Tobin’s Q. The factors being referred to in the text, 
however, are not ones included this way in the regression. The assumption that the omission 
of these factors does not bias the results will be correct in many cases  Where it is not, 
however, the reason for the omission may be that, for example, the factor is not easily 
observable or simply that it is incorrectly regarded by the author of the study as irrelevant. 
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these boosts and diminishments will largely cancel each other out, thereby 
revealing just the impact of the governance rating.  
In a fixed effects test, the sample being tested consists of the pairing of the 
index rating and the Tobin’s Q for each firm only in the year or years, if any, 
when the firm changed its governance structure in a way that altered its rating. 
This approach is typically used to guard against an omitted variable problem 
that can arise with an OLS test. That is, the fixed-effects regression seeks to 
control for the possibility that, contrary to the OLS assumptions, there are one 
or more non-tested factors affecting Q that are not randomly distributed and 
that correlate with the firm’s governance rating. 
If there are one or more such factors, an OLS result that appears to show a 
relation between a good governance rating and Tobin’s Q could be partially, or 
possibly entirely, due instead to the untested factor or factors. However, as 
long as the untested factor or factors are time invariant in their influence on 
Tobin’s Q—i.e., have a fixed effect—this omitted variable problem is avoided 
by running a regression that, out of all the observations of all the firms in all 
the sample years, considers only those relating to the firms that in any given 
year changed their governance structures in a rating altering way. This is 
because the other factor or factors will have the same impact on Tobin’s Q 
before and after the governance change and so the test isolates the effect on 
Tobin’s Q of just the governance change.165  
2. Summary of Our Findings 
Consistent with the earlier studies, our cross-sectional OLS test for the 
entire fifteen-year sample period finds a highly significant positive 
relationship, both statistically and economically, between firms with good 
governance ratings and their Tobin’s Qs. Also consistent with previous studies, 
our fixed effects test for the entire fifteen-year period similarly shows a highly 
significant positive relationship, both statistically and economically, between a 
score-improving governance change and Tobin’s Q.  
Comparing the 2000-2002 period with the other years in the sample, 
however, reveals a very new and previoulsy unregognized result: the fixed 
effects test results diverge sharply from the OLS test results. The fixed effects 
tests reveal that a changed governance rating in the scandal years is associated 
 
165 Professors Bartlett and Partnoy recommend using a “first differences” approach to 
solving this hidden-variable problem rather than our fixed-effects approach. Bartlett & 
Partnoy, supra note 34, at 1. Each approach eliminates the impact of time-invariant hidden 
variables. The only difference is that our approach takes mean-differences rather than first-
differences. We have choosen to present the results of using the fixed-effects approach in 
part because it maintains comparability with those index studies that attempt to control for 
such hidden variables. Also, although the first-differences approach narrows the timing gap 
between the before and after observations of Q relative to the moment of the governance 
change, it also has less statistiscal power because it does not allow for as many observations. 
In any event, we have also run first-differences regressions and our results are essentially 
the same. 
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with a much larger change in Tobin’s Q than a comparably sized rating change 
occurring in other years. This difference between 2000-2002 and the other 
years is highly significant both statistically and economically. In contrast, the 
OLS tests show no significant difference between the 2000-2002 period and 
the other years in terms of the relationship between a firm’s governance score 
and its Tobin’s Q. 
In addition to investigating the role of differences in information asymmetry 
across time periods, we investigate them as well across different types of firms, 
another test of our hypothesis that the effect of governance depends on context. 
Firms that engage in significant R&D typically have greater information 
asymmetry associated with them than other firms.166 We divide our full fifteen-
year sample between R&D and non-R&D firms. Relative to the normal period, 
the increase in a governance change’s impact on Tobin’s Q during the scandal 
period was greater by a statistically significant amount for R&D firms than it 
was for non-R&D firms. 
3. Implications of Our Findings 
This difference between the fixed effects comparison (scandal period versus 
normal period) and the OLS comparison strongly suggests that signaling was at 
work during the scandal period. To see why, we first need to imagine a world 
where signaling is not possible and, consider what, in that world, we would 
expect our OLS and fixed effects results to look like in both the normal and 
scandal periods. Then we will allow for the possibility of signaling and 
consider what our actual OLS and fixed effects results for the normal and the 
scandal periods can tell us about whether signaling was in fact at work at least 
during the scandal period. 
a. A Hypothetical World Without Signaling 
Imagine a world where the market understands the quality of a firm’s 
management just as well as do the managers themselves. In other words, there 
would be no information asymmetry and hence no room for signaling. In this 
world, we would have only the theories relating to the first two links—filtering 
and incentives/informedness—to explain the relationship between firm 
governance structures and their Tobin’s Qs. Under these first two theories, a 
firm with better governance structures will on average have better managers, 
and they will be more incentivized and informed.167 Relative to a firm with a 
worse governance structure, these managers will on average make decisions 
that generate greater cash flow in the future. A firm’s share price represents the 
market’s assessment of its future cash flows discounted to present value and in 
an efficient market this price quickly and fully reflects all publically available 
information relevant for estimating future cash flow. A firm’s corporate 
 
166 See supra note 17 and accompanying text (summarizing research showing that firms 
engaging in major R&D are hard for market to evaluate). 
167 See supra Section II.A (summarizing the two theories). 
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governance structure is publicly known and this is so whether the structure was 
recently changed or has been in place for some time. Either way, the impact of 
a governance structure with a given index rating on a firm’s future expected 
cash flows will, in an efficient market, be reflected in the firm’s share price 
and hence in its Tobin’s Q. So, at any point in time, the average impact of a 
governance structure with a given rating on Tobin’s Qs will be the same 
whether the structure has been in place for a long time or was adopted only 
recently. In each case the question relates to how the structure will affect future 
cash flows. Put another way, the difference in the average impact on Tobin’s Q 
of two differently rated governance structures will be the same whether we are 
talking about two different firms, one of which has had the worse rated 
structure for some time and the other of which has had the better rated one for 
some time, or about a single firm that has just switched from the same more 
poorly rated structure to the same better rated one. 
For this hypothetical world without signaling, now consider what 
comparisons between the scandal-period and the normal-period OLS and fixed 
effects results would look like and what they would imply. During the scandal 
period, if there is an increase in the market’s perception of (i) the value of high 
quality management, (ii) the effectiveness of a better rated governance 
structure with a filtering process leading to higher quality management, and/or 
(iii) the effectiveness of a better rated structure in providing the incentives and 
information to promote better management decisions, the impact of a firm’s 
governance structure on its Tobin’s Q through the first two links would be 
strengthened.  
This possible scandal-period strengthening either occurs or not. If it does not 
occur, neither the OLS or fixed effects results should show a difference 
between the scandal period and the normal period. If this scandal-period 
strengthening does occur, we would expect to see a difference between the 
scandal period and the normal period for both the OLS and fixed effects 
results.  
To see the reason why, first consider the OLS results. These are primarily 
driven by a comparison of the Tobin’s Qs of different firms with differently 
rated governance structures that they have had for some time, what we might 
call “continuing” firms. If there is a strengthening of impact through the first 
two links, when we compare two sets of continuing firms, ones with 
governance structures having a given poor index rating and ones with 
governance structures having a more favorable index rating, the difference 
between the two groups’ average Tobin’s Qs should widen because the 
strengthened link means that the difference in structure should lead to a larger 
difference in expected future cash flows of all the firms in the sample. This 
widening should be reflected in the OLS results. If there were no strengthening 
of the link, we would expect to see no difference in the OLS results between 
the scandal period and the normal years. 
Now consider the fixed effects results, which are driven solely by a 
comparison between normal and scandal periods of the Tobin’s Qs of firms 
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that change their governance structures, what we might call “change” firms. 
Take a set of firms that, during a year in the normal period, change from 
having governance structures with a poor index rating to governance structures 
having a better index rating, and compare that to a set of firms that make the 
same change during a year in the scandal period. If there is a strengthening 
through the first two links during the scandal period, the Tobin’s Qs of the 
firms that changed during the scandal period should on average increase by 
more than the Tobin’s Q’s of the firms that changed in the normal period and 
this difference should be reflected in the fixed effects results.168 Again, if there 
is no strengthening of the link, we again would expect to see no difference 
between fixed effects results for the scandal periods and the normal periods. 
b. Allowing for the Possibility of Signaling 
Now adopt the more realistic assumption that the market does not 
understand the quality of a firm’s management as well as do the managers 
themselves. In other words, there is an information asymmetry and so there is 
at least the possibility that signaling could operate when a firm changes its 
governance structure. 
For the reasons just discussed, continuing firms—the ones that according to 
our assumptions still send no signal— would show no difference between the 
OLS results in the scandal period versus those in the normal period unless one 
or both of the first two links between governance and Tobin’s Q were 
strengthened during the scandal period. No difference in OLS results between 
the periods, therefore means there was no such strengthening of either of the 
first two links during the scandal period. Even absent strengthening in the first 
and second links, however, there could still be a difference between the 
scandal and normal periods in the fixed effects results. Again, these results 
relate only to firms in years in which they make their rating-altering changes in 
governance structures, which according to our hypothesis could be a positive 
or negative signal of managerial quality. So if we see such a difference 
between the periods in the fixed effects results but not in the OLS results, it 
can only be due to a strengthening of the signal sent by a change in the scandal 
 
168 This assertion needs a small qualification, but not one that undermines our 
interpretation of our results. To the extent that the share price reaction to a change in 
governance structure reflects the anticipation of a change in filtering—the basis of our first 
theory concerning the link between governance and Tobin’s Q—this may take time to effect 
future cash flows. Thus, it may matter whether a firm has a particular governance structure 
that was just put in place or one that it has had for longer. Consider a structure that includes 
an attribute that tends to enhance filtering and hence is an attribute that boosts the rating a 
firm receives. For a firm that has had this attribute longer, its discounted future cash flows 
do not include the periods when the filtering is still doing its work, i.e., filtering’s 
improvement in future cash flows will have been fully realized. Thus, the impact of this 
attribute on Tobin’s Q for a firm that has had it for some time will be larger than for a firm 
that just adopted it. The same would be true in the opposite direction with respect to firms 
with an attribute that would tend to decrease filtering. 
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period relative to one sent in the normal period. This is just what our results 
show. 
Our OLS results show that, relative to the normal period, during the scandal 
period there was no widening of the difference in average Tobin’s Q scores 
between firms with a poorly rated governance structure and firms with more 
favorably rated ones, at least not one of a size great enough to be statistically 
significant.169 The OLS results relate predominantly to firms that did not 
change their governance structure during the scandal years—the “continuing 
firms”—and hence firms that were not sending a signal of the kind we are 
discussing here.170 Thus, the only ways these firms’ governance structures 
could impact their Tobin’s Qs is through the first and second links. The fact 
that our OLS results show no statistically significant widening of impact on 
Tobin’s Q from having a better rated structure versus of more poorly rate one 
suggests that these two governance links were not strengthened during the 
scandal period. 
Our fixed effects results show that, relative to the normal period, there was, 
in the scandal period, on average a very statistically significant greater change 
in Tobin’s Q for firms that changed from a structure with one rating to a 
structure with a different rating. Viewed in isolation, these fixed effects 
findings could be caused by (i) a scandal-period strengthening of the impact of 
firm governance structure on their Tobin’s Q through the first and second 
links, and/or (ii) a scandal-period increase in the value of the governance 
structure’s signal concerning management quality. When we take into account 
the OLS findings, however, we can rule out the first cause. If, as indicated by 
the OLS result, a given governance structure’s impact on Tobin’s Q through 
the first and second links is not strengthened during the scandal period for 
firms that continue with that structure, there is no reason to think that it would 
be strengthened for firms that have just changed to this structure.171  
In sum, the fixed effects results show that the impact of a ratings change on 
Tobin’s Q was greater by a statistically significant amount in the scandal 
period versus the normal period wheras the OLS results do not, and this 
suggests: (i) a governance change can act as a signal of managerial quality and 
did so during the 2000-2002, and (ii) whatever was the signaling impact of 
such a change on stock price and Tobin’s Q in the normal period (and there 
probably is some impact), its impact was larger by a highly statistically 
significant amount during 2000-2002 period. The market in this period was 
unusually uncertain about the quality of management of publicly traded firms 
generally because of the unexpected incidence of fraud in respected 
 
169 See infra Section III.D.2. 
170 The OLS finding includes all firms for all years in the sample under study, both the 
large majority that did not change their structures in a given year and the small minority that 
did. 
171 See infra Section III.D.2 (summarizing cross-sectional OLS results). 
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companies.172 As a result, receipt of a clarifying signal had an unusually large 
effect.173 
C. Data Sources and Variables Used 
As previously described, our study employs the two well-known governance 
indices discussed above: Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick’s G index174 and 
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell’s E index.175 For each of these indices, we run a 
firm-level fixed effects regression on the relationship between the change in a 
firm’s index rating and the change in the firm’s Tobin’s Q for the years 1992-
2006. We also run, for each index, an OLS regression on the cross-sectional 
 
172 See discussion supra Sections III.A.1-3 (recounting accounting scandals at Enron, 
HealthSouth, and Adelphia in early 2000s). 
173 In Part II.B.4, supra, we discussed how a continuation of a governance structure that 
was adopted at some point in the past and received a given index rating might itself provide 
a form of message concerning today’s managerial quality. The discussion makes clear, 
however, that a change in the current period to a governance structure with this same rating 
constitutes a more valuable signal concerning managerial quality. In other words, the 
signaling significance of having adopted a particular structure erodes over time. Firm 
governance ratings are relatively stable over time and so for most of the firms in the OLS 
sample, they have not changed their governance structures in many years. See supra note 
170 (finding that majority of firms studied did not change governance structure). Thus, the 
value of the signals coming from their continued structures has been eroded considerably. It 
is true that, relative to normal times, even this considerably eroded residual signal would 
presumably have become more valuable in the scandal period, given the increased 
information asymmetry concerning managerial quality. But the scandal-years magnification 
of this eroded residual signal should have much less absolute impact on Tobin’s Q than the 
similar magnification of the signal sent by a change in governance structure. This 
conclusion tends to be confirmed by the fact that our OLS results, which relate primarily to 
firms that simply continued their governance structures, show no statistically significant 
increase in the impact of differences in index scores on Tobin’s Q during the scandal period 
versus the normal period. Whatever the value of the signal coming from the continuation of 
a given governance structure, it was sufficiently small that, even when magnified during the 
scandal period, it did not add to the total impact of differences in firm index ratings on their 
Tobin’s Qs by a statistically significant amount. It should also be noted that if there was any 
signaling effect from the continuation of a given governance structure, this would not 
undermine our larger conclusion that the increase, if any, in the impact on Tobin’s Q 
through the filtering and incentives/informedness links during the scandal period was not 
large enough to be statistically significant. This conclusion is based on simple arithmetic. 
Our OLS results show that for firms that did not change structure, the increase, if any, in the 
total impact on Tobin’s Q through all three links was not large enough to be statistically 
significant. If there were some signaling effect from simply continuing a governance 
structure, this effect would actually have been magnified in the scandal period. So any 
increase in the impact from the filtering and incentives/informedness links could not by 
itself be large enough to be statistically significant. 
174 Gompers, Ishii & Metrick, supra note 8, at 108. 
175 Bebchuk, Cohen & Ferrell, supra note 8, at 785. 
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relationship between a firm’s index score and Tobin’s Q for the same years. 
We then subdivide the sample into two parts—the “scandal” period of 2000-
2002 and the “normal” period consisting of our sample’s surrounding years, 
1992-1999 and 2003-2006. We compare, for both the fixed effect and OLS 
tests, the results in the scandal years with the results in the surrounding normal 
years.  
We focus on all publicly traded companies which have a G index score. For 
ease of reference, we give our variable names in italics. As noted earlier, the G 
index quantifies governance attributes with regard to a variety of matters, 
including a number of factors relating to the capacity of incumbent 
management to resist hostile takeovers.176 A firm’s score can vary from a 
minimum of zero to a maximum of twenty-four.177 A lower score is interpreted 
as reflecting a better corporate governance structure. The E index consists of 
six of the G Index items, which are interpreted as most related to the capacity 
of management to protect the company from capital market disciple: staggered 
boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, poison pills, golden 
parachutes, supermajority requirements for mergers and limits to charter 
amendments.178  
For the above set of firms, we obtain financial data from Standard and 
Poor’s Annual Compustat database. Consistent with the previous literature, 
firm value creation is proxied by Tobin’s Q. Following that literature, we 
calculate Tobin’s Q as the market value of a firm’s equity minus book value of 
equity plus the market value of a firm’s debt divided by the book value of its 
assets.179 We winsorize the values of Tobin’s Q at the one-percent level and 
ninety-nine-percent level, so that outliers do not significantly affect our results.  
We control for four firm-specific variables that prior literature suggests 
might independently affect measures of firm value creation independent of the 
effect of its governance structure. The first variable is the firm’s ratio of debt to 
total assets (“Debt”), which is calculated as the ratio of short-term debt plus 
long-term debt to total assets. The second is the firm’s ratio of research and 
development expenses to total assets (“R&D”).180 The final two variables are 
 
176 See supra Part I. 
177 See Gompers, Ishii & Metrick, supra note 8, at 115 (showing that “G has a possible 
range from 1 to 24”). 
178 See Bebchuk, Cohen & Ferrell, supra note 8, at 784-85 (describing construction of 
index using items listed above). We obtained data for the Gindex and Eindex from Martijn 
Cremers. 
179 See Darius Palia, The Endogeneity of Managerial Compensation in Firm Valuation: A 
Solution, 14 REV. FIN. STUD. 735, 742 (2001) (describing method for calculating Tobin’s 
Q); Hyun-Han Shin and René M. Stulz, Are Internal Capital Markets Efficient?, 113 Q. J. 
ECON. 531, 534 (1998) (defining Tobin’s Q as “the value of equity plus the book value of 
total assets minus the book value of equity”); Smith & Watts, supra note 34, at 266. 
180 See supra note 14 and accompanying text (summarizing studies accounting for R&D 
as a factor). In many cases the firm has missing data for research and development 
expenses. Rather than discard these observations, we set a dummy variable(“RDdum”) to 
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related to the firm’s size.181 We include the natural logarithm of total sales 
(“Lsales”), and for any nonmonotonic effect we also include its square 
(“Lsales2”).  
We present the summary descriptive statistics of these variables in Table I. 
We have 26,098 observations, consisting of 3,516 unique firms for the years 
1992-2006. We find the average Tobin’s Q to be 1.004, which is higher than 
the median value of 0.675. There is substantial variation, which, assuming 
Tobin’s Q to have a normal distribution, can vary between -0.122 and 6.17.182 
The average Gindex is 9.06 with a similar median value. The Eindex has an 
average value of 2.3 and a median value of 2, which is not surprising given that 
the maximum value is 6. Our sample firms have average book leverage to asset 
(Debt) ratio of 25.5%, with median ratios of 23.5%. The average firm has a 
research and development expense to asset (R&D) ratio of 2.6%, with the 
median firm having no significant research and development expenses. On 
average, our sample firms have a natural logarithm of sales (Lsales) of 7.14, 
although there are many firms which are extremely large. The average size of 
our firms is $4.3B, with a median value $1.14B. 
 
Table I. Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Median Standard Deviation 
Tobin’s Q 1.004 0.675 1.063 
Gindex 9.064 9 2.752 
Eindex 2.297 2 1.358 
Debt 0.255 0.235 0.265 
R&D 0.026 0 0.079 
RDdum 0.509 1 0.500 
Lsales 7.143 7.048 1.526 
Lsales2 53.35 49.67 22.09 
 
D. Tests and Results—Full Sample (1992-2006) 
1. Fixed Effects Results 
We first estimate a firm-level fixed effects regression of Tobin’s Q on the 
two governance indices for the full sample period. It is the nature of fixed 
 
unity for missing data, and equal to zero when not missing. Additionally, R&D is set to zero 
in such cases. This implies that missing research and development expenses does not 
significantly affect the slope or sensitivity of R&D to Tobin’s Q. 
181 See Gompers, Ishii & Metrick, supra note 8, at 119 (listing firm size as a variable for 
G-index). 
182 In the lower tail of the distribution we find negative values, as the market value of 
equity is less than the difference between the book values of equity and debt. See supra text 
accompanying note 108 (defining Tobin’s Q as difference between equity and book value of 
equity). 
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effect tests that they measure the effect on the dependent variable (in our case 
Tobin’s Q) of a change in the independent variable (in our case the governance 
index).183 Hence this is the appropriate test for exploring whether a change in 
an independent variable is a signal of some kind. The fixed effects technique 
also serves as a check on the conclusion from our cross-sectional OLS tests 
reported below (and those of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick)184 that there is a 
relationship between better firm governance scores and higher Tobin’s Qs. As 
discussed earlier, using the fixed effects technique tests whether this OLS 
conclusion is a false positive arising from a hidden variable that correlates with 
both Tobin’s Q and the governance scores, but that is invariant over time. Our 
finding of a fixed effects relationship between Tobin’s Q and the governance 
indices allows us to reject this alternative explanation of the OLS results.  
Table II presents our fixed effects results for both the Gindex and the 
Eindex. All standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level, and the 
fixed-effects are jointly statistically significant but not presented. The robust t-
statistics are presented in parentheses.  
The impact of a change in the Gindex on Tobin’s Q is given in column 2. 
We find a coefficient of -0.0259, which is statistically significant at the one-
percent level. In other words, this result is highly statistically significant, 
meaning that we can reject with at least 99% confidence that this finding was 
simply the result of chance. The impact of a change in the Eindex is given in 
column 3. We find a coefficient of -0.0384 on the Eindex, which is similarly 
statistically significant at the one-percent level. This coefficient is very similar 
to the Bebchuk, Ferrell, and Cohencoefficient of -0.028 in their fixed effects 
regressions, although the respective sample periods differ slightly (ours is 
1992-2006, and theirs is 1990-2003). Table II’s results are consistent with 
those of the previous literature. This suggests that there is nothing unique about 
our sample that is generating our subsequent results.185 
 
Table II. Fixed-Effects Regressions of Tobin’s Q on Corporate Governance 
Indices 
Variable G-index E-index 
Governance Indices -0.0259*** 
(-3.05) 
-0.0384*** 
(-2.65) 
Debt 0.322*** 0.318*** 
 
183 See, e.g., Bartlett & Partnoy, supra note 34, at 39 (describing use of fixed effect 
regressions to measure effect on firm value of changes firms made in governance). 
184 Gompers, Ishii & Metrick, supra note 8, at 129 (describing cross-sectional differences 
in their results). 
185 In examining the relationship between the control variables and firm performance, 
Table II also shows that firms with higher debt levels and research and development 
expenses are associated with higher firm value. The relationship between firm size and 
performance is non-monotonic, with a positive relationship that turns negative at the highest 
levels of firm size. 
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(4.92) (4.93) 
R&D 0.596** 
(2.15) 
0.597** 
(2.15) 
RDdum 0.051 
(0.99) 
0.050 
(0.98) 
Lsales 0.108* 
(1.87) 
0.103* 
(1.80) 
Lsales2 -0.010** 
(-2.23) 
-0.009** 
(-2.19) 
Constant 0.821*** 
(3.40) 
0.691*** 
(2.97) 
R2 0.024 0.026 
***Statistically significant at the 1% level, **statistically significant at the 5% level, and 
*statistically significant at the 10% level, respectively. 
 
2. Cross-sectional OLS Results 
In this section, we provide cross-sectional OLS results with 10 Fama-French 
industry controls and year dummies (not reported) and with standard errors 
clustered at the firm-level.186 For each variable, we calculate the average across 
the years by firm. By doing so, we abstract away from any time variation and 
focus on the cross-sectional variation only.187 These results, consistent with the 
OLS results of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick,188 show that both Gindex and 
Eindex are negatively correlated to firm Tobin’s Q, i.e., corporate governance 
structures that garner good governance ratings are associated with greater firm 
value creation.  
Table III presents these OLS results for both the Gindex and the Eindex. The 
robust t-statistics are presented in parentheses.  
 
Table III. OLS Regessions of Tobin’s Q on Corporate Governance Indices 
Variable G-index E-index 
Governance Indices -0.028*** 
(-5.13) 
-0.079*** 
(-6.72) 
Debt 0.202*** 
(2.65) 
0.212*** 
(2.83) 
R&D 2.485** 
(2.20) 
2.452** 
(2.18) 
RDdum -0.340*** -0.341*** 
 
186 Note that a firm level fixed-effects model subsumes any impact of industry and 
therefore no industry controls need to be included. 
187 See WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS (7th ed. 2005) (discussing  
methods of using least squares estimators). 
188 Gompers, Ishii & Metrick, supra note 8, at 127. 
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(-5.70) (-5.74) 
Lsales 0.038 
(0.52) 
0.051 
(0.69) 
Lsales2 -0.002 
(-0.49) 
-0.004 
(-0.80) 
Constant 1.274*** 
(3.76) 
1.197*** 
(3.58) 
R2 0.109 0.113 
***Statistically significant at the 1% level, **statistically significant at the 5% level, and 
*statistically significant at the 10% level, respectively. 
 
The impact of a difference between firms in their respective Gindex scores 
on their Tobin’s Qs is given in column 2 of Table III. We find a coefficient of 
–0.028 which yet again is statistically significant at the one-percent level. The 
impact of a change in the Eindex is given in column 3. We find a coefficient of 
–0.079 on the Eindex which is also statistically significant at the one-percent 
level. Our Gindex results are similar to the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick189 
coefficient of –0.043 in their OLS regressions. Again, while our sample 
periods differ slightly, the similarity in results suggests that there is nothing 
unusual about our sample that is generating our subsequent results.  
3. Summary of the Full Sample Results 
Our full sample OLS results suggest that governance structures associated 
with good ratings, by filtering out bad managers and/or providing more 
effective managerial incentives, are consistent with better corporate decision-
making and hence, over time, higher cash flows available for shareholders. Our 
full sample fixed effects results affirm that consistency. They indicate that the 
OLS results do not represent a false positive caused by some hidden, time 
invariant variable that correlates with both firm Tobin’s Q scores and firm 
governance scores.  
These full sample results, taken by themselves, do not, however, tell us 
whether a firm’s decision to change its structure in a score-altering way 
constitutes a signal to the market concerning managment quality. Assuming, as 
our OLS results suggest, that governance structures with better scores do in 
fact lead to higher cash flows to shareholders, we would see the fixed effects 
results that we have obtained even if the market were already fully informed 
about the quality of a firm’s management prior to the change, i.e., a situation 
where there would be no need to signal management quality. This is because 
when a firm changes its structure in a rating-improving way, the anticipation of 
the resultant better decision-making and increased future cash flows would, in 
an efficient market, lead to an immediate increase in share price. Thus, even 
without any signaling, our data suggests that the change in a firm’s structure 
would still lead to a change in its Tobin’s Q. 
 
189 Id. at 127 (summarizing negative G-index coefficient results). 
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E. Tests and Results—Comparing Time Periods: The 2000-2002 Scandal 
Years Versus Other Years 
 In reality, of course, the market is never fully informed about the quality of 
a firm’s management. Suppose that in particular years the market believes it is 
more poorly informed about firm management quality than in normal years. 
Further suppose, however, that the market’s perception of the long run effect 
of a good governance structure on future cash flows (through better filtering 
out of bad managers and/or better incentives for all managers) does not change 
much from one year to the next. Under these assumptions, as discussed earlier, 
we would expect that if a score-altering change in governance structure serves 
as a signal concerning the quality of management, the signal would take on 
more value in years when the market perceives itself to be otherwise less 
informed about managerial quality.  
As outlined before, our hypothesis is, therefore, that if changes in 
governance structure constitute a signal concerning the quality of management, 
a fixed effects test will reveal that they have a bigger effect on Tobin’s Q in 
years when the market perceives itself to be less informed concerning 
management quality relative to how well informed it perceives itself in normal 
years.190 OLS tests that do not show a larger effect of governance on Tobin’s Q 
in the less informed years than in normal years would suggest that such fixed 
effects results for the less informed years are not the result of the market 
believing in such years that a change in governance structure will have a bigger 
long run effect on future cash flows. 
For the reasons discussed earlier, we believe that 2000-2002 accounting 
scandal years was a period when the market perceived itself to be less 
informed concerning the quality of firm management than in normal times.191 
Thus, to test our hypothesis concerning the signaling effect of changes in 
governance structure, we compare the fixed effects and OLS results for 2000-
2002 with their respective results for the other years in our sample.  
1. Fixed Effects Results Comparison 
The first step in the comparison test is to split our full sample into two 
periods: the 2000-2002 accounting scandal years and the twelve years 
surrounding the accounting (1992-1999 and 2003-2006). We then analyze each 
of these periods, using the same firm-level fixed effects regression 
specifications used for the full sample. Finally, we consider the differences 
between these fixed effect findings regarding each of the two periods. These 
results are given in Table IV. 
The impact of a change in the Gindex on firm performance in the accounting 
scandal period is shown in column 2. We find a coefficient of -0.1061, which 
is more than four times as large as the normal times coefficient of -0.0249 
 
190 See supra Section III.D.3 (laying out this hypothesis based on data). 
191 See supra text accompanying note 162 (discussing overall state of distrust by market 
in management). 
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given in column 3. Both coefficients are statistically significant at the one-
percent level. When we compare the differential impact between scandal and 
normal years in column 4, we find a negative effect of -0.081, which is also 
statistically significant at the one-percent level. Thus, we can say with a very 
high degree of statistical confidence that mere chance was not responsible for 
this observed difference between 2000-2002 and the surrounding twelve years 
in the impact on Tobin’s Q of from a firm changing its governance structure.  
We then examine a similar relationship for the Eindex. Column 5 addresses 
the accounting scandal period. We find a coefficient of -0.1645, which is about 
three times the normal year’s coefficient of -0.0559 given in column 6. Both 
coefficients are again statistically significant at the one-percent level. When we 
compare the differential impact between accounting scandal and normal years 
in column 4, we find a negative effect of -0.1085, again statistically significant 
at the one-percent level. 
These numbers can be usefully put in perspective in terms of their economic 
significance. The Tobin’s Q of the median firm is 0.675. Thus we can 
approximate the percentage positive impact of a governance change yeilding a 
one point index rating drop in normal period on the Tobin’s Q of such a firm to 
be (0.0249)/0.675 = 3.69%. In contrast, the approximate percentage positive 
impact on Tobin’s Q of the nine point index drop in the scandal period is 
almost five times larger: (.1062)/0.675 = 15.73%.192  
Next, we examine the economic significance of the Eindex by analyzing the 
impact on Tobin’s Q of a favorable movement from the third quartile of the 
Eindex (equal to three) to the first quartile (equal to one), a change of two. We 
calculate the difference in the impact on Tobin’s Q of this two-point decrease 
in normal times and compare it to making the drop in accounting scandal 
times. We can approximate the percentage positive impact on Tobin’s Q of the 
two point drop in normal times as (.0559*2)/0.675 = 16.56%. Once again, the 
approximate percentage positive impact on Tobin’s Q of the two point drop in 
the scandal period is more than three times larger: (.1645*2)/0.675 = 48.75%.  
 
Table IV. Fixed-Effects Regressions of Tobin’s Q on Corporate Governance 
Provisions For the Accounting Scandal Period v. Normal Times 
 
192 This increase during the scandal period in the impact on Tobin’s Q from a change in 
one index scored governance attribute may at first impression seem surprisingly large. It 
becomes quite plausible, however, once it is appreciated that what we are seeing is the 
market’s reaction to the signal concerning managerial quality during a period of sharply 
increased information asymmetry, not a change in the market’s reaction to the impact of this 
governance change itself on the underlying value of the firm. In this regard, our results are 
comparable in some ways to the finding by Professors Karpoff, Lee, and Martin that when a 
firm has penalties imposed on it in an SEC enforcement action for financial 
misrepresentation, the adverse impact on share price from the damage to the reputation of 
the firm’s managers is almost eight times the adverse impact on share price from the 
resulting legal penalties. Jonathan Karpoff, D. Scott Lee & Gerald S. Martin, The Cost to 
Firms of Cooking the Books, 43 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANALYSIS 581, 581 (2008). 
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Variable 
 
 
Gindex Eindex 
2000-2002 
Scandal 
Period 
Normal 
Period 
 Scandal -
Normal 
2000-2002 
Scandal 
Period 
Normal 
Period 
Scandal -
Normal 
Gindex/ 
Eindex 
-0.1061*** 
(-4.92) 
-0.0249*** 
(-2.64) 
-0.081*** 
(-3.45) 
-0.1645*** 
(-4.95) 
-0.0559*** 
(-3.33) 
-0.1085** 
(-2.91) 
Debt 0.573* 
(1.86) 
0.293*** 
(5.55) 
 0.583* 
(1.88) 
0.291*** 
(5.58) 
 
R&D 1.013 
(0.56) 
0.849*** 
(2.77) 
 1.065 
(0.59) 
0.849** 
(2.78) 
 
RDdum -0.115 
(-0.99) 
0.079 
(1.37) 
 0.134 
(1.16) 
0.079 
(1.35) 
 
Lsales 0.223** 
(2.04) 
0.131 
(1.56) 
 0.225** 
(2.05) 
0.129 
(1.55) 
 
Lsales2 -0.026** 
(-2.47) 
-0.009 
(-1.59) 
 -0.026** 
(-2.52) 
-0.009 
(-1.59) 
 
Cons 1.515*** 
(2.97) 
0.639** 
(1.97) 
 0.939* 
(1.94) 
0.551* 
(1.72) 
 
R2 0.003 0.011  0.005 0.013  
***Statistically significant at the 1% level, **statistically significant at the 5% level, and 
*statistically significant at the 10% level, respectively. 
 
2. OLS Results 
In this section, we provide cross-sectional OLS results comparing the 2000-
2002 accounting scandal period with the years in our sample that surround it. 
Again, we calculate for each variable the average across the years by firm, 
thereby abstracting away from any time variation, and focus on the cross-
sectional variation only. The results in Table V show that both Gindex and 
Eindex rating are negatively correlated with firm performance in both the 
2000-2002 accounting scandal years and in the normal years in our sample 
(i.e., better rated governance structures are associated with higher Tobin’s 
Q’s), but there is no statistically significant difference in the strength of the 
relationship in between the scandal and normal periods.  
 
Table V. Cross-Sectional OLS Regressions of Tobin’s Q on Corporate 
Governance Provisions for the Accounting Scandal Period v. Normal Times 
 
Variable 
 
 
Gindex Eindex 
Scandal Normal Scandal - 
Normal 
Scandal Normal Scandal -
Normal 
Gindex or 
Eindex 
-0.0309*** 
(-3.64) 
-0.0302*** 
(-5.53) 
-0.001 
(-0.72) 
-0.0862*** 
(-5.15) 
-0.0730*** 
(-6.28) 
-0.013 
(-0.65) 
Debt 0.367** 0.180**  0.383*** 0.186***  
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(2.55) (2.51) (2.68) (2.63) 
R&D 4.188*** 
(6.64) 
2.338** 
(1.98) 
 4.121*** 
(6.53) 
2.316** 
(1.97) 
 
RDdum -0.312*** 
(-6.23) 
-0.359*** 
(-5.80) 
 -0.313*** 
(-6.28) 
-0.360*** 
(-5.84) 
 
Lsales -0.220** 
(-2.40) 
0.019 
(0.26) 
 -0.231** 
(-2.55) 
0.026 
(0.36) 
 
Lsales2 -0.010 
(-1.63) 
-0.001 
(-0.24) 
 -0.011* 
(-1.89) 
-0.002 
(-0.47) 
 
Cons 0.166 
(0.48) 
1.281*** 
(3.83) 
 0.086 
(0.25) 
0.178*** 
(3.57) 
 
R2 0.096 0.090  0.101 0.093  
***Statistically significant at the 1% level, **statistically significant at the 5% level, and 
*statistically significant at the 10% level, respectively. 
 
3. Summary of Results in Accounting Scandal Years Versus Other Years 
The results reported above provide strong support for our thesis that the 
impact of corporate governance on performance is highly sensitive to context: 
in this case, specifically, that changes in governance structure in particular 
contexts can constitute a credible signal concerning the quality of management. 
As our signaling hypothesis predicts, our fixed effects tests reveal that score 
changes in corporate governance have a highly statistically significant larger 
effect on Tobin’s Q in the accounting scandal period 2000-2002, years when 
the market appeared to perceive itself as less informed concerning 
management quality, than during the normal twelve year surrounding period. 
Our OLS tests reveal no statistically different effect of governance structure 
differences across firms on Tobin’s Q in 2000-2002 than in other years. These 
latter results suggest that our fixed effects results do not arise because, in the 
accounting scandal years, the market believed the long-run effect of 
governance changes on future cash flows will be greater because of their 
filtering or incentive/informedness effects. 
4. Robustness of the Fixed-Effects Results to Alternative Definitions of 
Normal Times 
In the above sections we included a large time period of twelve years as our 
proxy for normal times. Accordingly, as a robustness test, we examine the 
three years prior to (i.e., 1997 to 1999) the accounting scandal period, and the 
three years after (i.e., 2003 to 2005) the accounting scandal period, 
respectively. The results of the fixed effects regressions are given in Table VI. 
Once again, we find that the impact of the governance variables in the 
accounting scandal period is statistically significantly larger than the impact of 
the governance variables in the three years periods prior to, or after, the 
scandal period. 
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Table VI. Fixed-Effects Regressions of Tobin’s Q on Corporate Governance 
Provisions for Firms in the Accounting Scandal Period v. Different Definitions 
of Normal Times 
 
Variable 
 
 
Normal Times: 1997-1999 Normal Times: 2003-2005 
Scandal Normal Scandal - 
Normal 
Scandal Normal Scandal -
Normal 
Gindex -0.1062** 
(-4.92) 
-0.008 
(-0.32) 
-0.100*** 
(-3.52) 
-0.1062** 
(-4.92) 
-0.007 
(-0.30) 
-0.099*** 
(-3.07) 
Eindex -0.1645*** 
(-4.95) 
-0.029 
(-1.07) 
-0.135** 
(-3.14) 
-0.1645*** 
(-4.95) 
-0.033 
(-0.89) 
-0.131*** 
(-2.63) 
***Statistically significant at the 1% level, **statistically significant at the 5% level, and 
*statistically significant at the 10% level, respectively. Control variables are included in 
each regression specification but are not presented in the table. 
 
5. Robustness tests: focusing on staggered boards and poison pills 
Many commentators believe that the most important governance-structure 
determinants of a poorly managed firm’s susceptibility to takeover are the 
presence or absence of the combination of a poison pill and a staggered board, 
two of the twenty-four elements going into the G index and two of the six 
elements going into the E index.193 We examine the change in Tobin’s Q 
associated with changes in these two elements during the accounting scandal 
years of 2000-2002 versus the effect of a change during the other years in our 
sample. The results in Table VII show that, in each case, the effect was greater 
in the 2000-2002 period by an amount that was statistically significant at the 
1% level. In other words, we once again find a larger impact from changes in 
governance structures in a period of greater uncertainty as to management 
quality. These findings reinforce our conclusion that certain governance 
structure changes can serve as a signal of management quality. 
 
Table VII. Changes in Tobin’s Q when Firm Initiated a Poison Pill or 
Staggered Board for the Scandal Period v. Normal Times 
  Scandal Normal Scandal –  
Normal 
Initiated  
poison pill 
Mean 
(t-statistic) 
Number 
-0.240*** 
(-3.32) 
210 
-0.200*** 
(-4.38) 
247 
-0.039*** 
-(5.37) 
Initiated  
staggered  
board 
Mean 
(t-statistic) 
Number 
-0.117 
(-1.22) 
49 
-0.053 
(-0.88) 
71 
-0.063*** 
(-4.95) 
 
193 See supra note 29 (noting potency of poison pill and staggered board in deterring 
takeover). 
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***Statistically significant at the 1% level, **statistically significant at the 5% level, and 
*statistically significant at the 10% level, respectively. 
 
Table VII reveals something else tending to support our signaling 
hypothesis: firms initiated poison pills and staggered boards (governance 
changes that lead to worse ratings) with much greater frequency during the 
scandal period than during the normal period. For poison pills, there were 70 
initiations per year during the three-year scandal period versus approximately 
21 initiations per year during the twelve-year normal period. For staggered 
boards, the comparable comparisons are approximately 16 per year during the 
scandal period versus about 6 per year in the normal period. Given that the 
frequency of takeovers was especially low during the 2000-2002 scandal 
period, the initiation of one of these changes would send to the market a 
particularly strong negative signal of low management quality: it would 
suggest an unusually high level of concern by the managers of the initiating 
firms that they would subsequently be found to be wanting and vulnerable to 
replacement through a takeover. And there would be particuarly little reason 
for high quality managers to initiate such changes and jam the negative signal 
being sent by the low quality managers.194 
F. Tests and Results—Comparing Different Types of Firms 
The results above relate to comparing time periods that differ in terms of the 
reliability of other information concerning managerial quality. They show that 
changes in a firm’s governance structures in the accounting scandal years had a 
larger effect on its Tobin’s Q than changes made in normal years. These results 
support the proposition that in identifiable contexts, changes in governance 
structure can have a signaling effect concerning managerial quality: if 
governance changes are signals of managerial quality, we would expect a 
bigger impact on firm value in situations where the market is less informed 
concerning such quality.  
 
194 . However, Catan, supra note 11, also presents evidence that can be interpreted as 
inconsistent with our signaling hypothesis. Catan reports that, based on public disclosure of 
accounting statements, a drop in performance by companies adopting clear-day poison pills 
occurs in the accounting periods closely preceding pill adoption. That drop performance 
could be interpreted as disclosing what we argue is addressed in the signal sent by pill 
adoption. For present purposes, however, we note that Catan’s analysis does not—because it 
is beyond the scope of his project—address the very large increase in the effect of pill 
adoption during the scandal period compared to adoption during the non-scandal years that 
he (and we) consider. The signaling hypothesis here is not that pill adoption signals prior 
poor firm performance, a result rejected by Cremers & Ferrell, supra note 16.  Rather, it is 
that, in the scandal period, when the uncertainty concerning management quality is very 
high, pill adoption provides new and significant (albeit noisy) information about the quality 
of management not revealed by prior reported accounting performance, including, of course, 
their possible dishonesty.,. 
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Additional support for this proposition comes from our results comparing 
types of firms that differ in the reliability of other information concerning 
managerial quality. Our comparison involves firms engaging in substantial 
R&D, which other studies suggest is harder for the market to evaluate,195 
versus those that do not. Firms that spend money on research and development 
(R&D) are more opaque on average than those that do not because in general it 
is much harder to assess how worthwhile these expenditures are than are 
expenditures for tangible physical assets.196 Thus, there is on average a greater 
asymmetry of information between managers and the market in the case of 
R&D firms.197  
We test this hypothesis multiple ways. First, we split our sample for the full 
fifteen years into firms with R&D expenditures and those with no such 
expenditures. We report our fixed effects regression results in Table VIII.198 
The impact of the Gindex on firm value creation for firms with R&D is shown 
is shown in column 2. We find a coefficient of –0.036, which is more twice as 
large as the non-R&D firms’ coefficient of –0.014 given in column 3. Both 
coefficients are statistically significant at the 95% level. When we compare the 
differential impact between R&D and non-R&D firms in column 4, we find a 
negative effect of –0.023. This difference is not statistically significant in 
conventional terms, since we can only rule out with about 80% confidence that 
the difference is not due to chance. Still, it is at least modest additional 
evidence in support of our signaling hypothesis.199 We get parallel results with 
regard to the impact of the Eindex on value creation, also reported in Table 
VIII.  
 
 
195 See supra note 17 and accompanying text (observing information asymmetry between 
managers of R&D heavy firms and market). 
196 See Aboody & Lev, supra note 17, at 2748 (explaining why R&D expenditures are 
more opaque than other capital and financial inputs in degree of opacity). 
197 See id. (listing three factors leading R&D expenditures to create more information 
asymmetry than traditional capital and financial outputs). 
198 We repeat our fixed effects regressions of Table IV with the same control variables, 
just substituting a comparison of R&D versus non-R&D firms for a comparison of scandal 
versus normal years. For ease of exposition, Table VIII presents only the results on the 
governance indices. 
199 Our failure to find a difference between R&D and non-R&D firms at the 95% 
confidence level could well be because our test does not have the power to detect the 
difference rather than that there is no difference. The standard error for our measurement of 
the difference between R&D and non-R&D firms is 0.017. The observed difference in a 
governance change’s impact on the Tobin’s Qs of the two kinds of firms to meet the ninety-
five percent confidence standard would thus need to be at least .033. Thus, for there to be 
even a 50-50 likelihood that a test in this situation would yield an observed change in 
Tobin’s Q this great, the actual difference would need to be .033. So if the actual impact for 
non-R&D firms was in fact .014, the actual impact for the R&D firms would need .047, 
three and one-half times as great. 
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Table VIII. Fixed-Effects Regressions of Tobin’s Q on Corporate Governance 
Provisions for Firms with and without R&D in the Scandal v. Normal Times 
 
Variable 
 
 
Fixed Effects 
With R&D No R&D With – 
No R&D 
Gindex -0.036** 
(-2.30) 
-0.014** 
(-2.03) 
-0.023 
(-1.31) 
Eindex -0.066** 
(-2.38) 
-0.029** 
(-2.17) 
-0.037 
(-1.21) 
***Statistically significant at the 1% level, **statistically significant at the 5% level, and 
*statistically significant at the 10% level, respectively. Control variables are included in 
each regression specification but are not presented in the table. 
 
Additional, and stronger, evidence supporting our hypothesis comes from 
our tests splitting our sample into firms with R&D expenditures and those with 
no such expenditures, and then, for each group, comparing the impact on 
Tobin’s Q of a score-altering governance change in the scandal years versus 
normal years. If our signaling hypothesis is correct, then we would expect that 
when R&D firms, which are less well understood by the market, change their 
governance structures, the impact of the change on their Tobin’s Q in the 
accounting scandal years would be even greater than for other firms that 
changed their governance structures in those years.  
We report our fixed effects regression results in Table IX.200 As our earlier 
results would suggest, both kinds of firms that change their governance 
structures have a greater change in Tobin’s Q in the scandal years versus 
normal years. But the R&D firms—those for whom there is a greater 
information asymmetry between managers and the market—have the larger of 
the increases and do so by a statistically significant amount, as shown in the 
last column of Table IX. Consistent with our earlier results, our OLS results 
reported in Table X show that for firms that do not engage in a governance 
change, neither type of firm—R&D or non-R&D—shows a statistically 
significant difference in terms of the impact of governance scores on Tobin’s 
Q between the scandal years and the normal years. In sum, in the 
circumstances involving the greatest information asymmetry between the 
market and insiders—R&D firms in the scandal period—we see the largest 
impact on the relationship between a change in a firm’s governance score and 
its Tobin’s Q, just as our signaling hypothesis would predict, and it is largest 
by a statistically significant amount. 
 
 
200 We repeat our fixed effects regressions of Table V with the same control variables, 
just substituting a comparison of R&D versus non-R&D firms for a comparison of scandal 
versus normal years. For ease of exposition Table IX presents only the results on the 
governance indices. 
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Table IX. Fixed-Effects Regressions of Tobin’s Q on Corporate Governance 
Provisions for Firms with and without R&D in the Scandal v. Normal Times 
 
Variable 
 
 
With R&D Without R&D Difference 
with and 
 without 
R&D 
Scandal Normal Scandal –  
Normal 
Scandal Normal Scandal – 
Normal 
 
Gindex -0.151*** 
(-3.57) 
-0.031* 
(-1.78) 
-0.119*** 
(-2.61) 
-0.064*** 
(-4.07) 
-0.010 
(-1.35) 
-0.055*** 
(-3.13) 
-0.064** 
(-2.31) 
Eindex -0.226*** 
(-3.78) 
-0.074** 
(-2.36) 
-0.151** 
(-2.24) 
-0.103*** 
(-3.24) 
-0.027* 
(-1.81) 
-0.076*** 
(-2.16) 
-0.075** 
(-1.99) 
***Statistically significant at the 1% level, **statistically significant at the 5% level, and 
*statistically significant at the 10% level, respectively. Control variables are included in 
each regression specification but are not presented in the table. 
 
Table X. OLS Regressions of Tobin’s Q on Corporate Governance Provisions 
for Firms with and without R&D in the Scandal v. Normal Times 
 
Variable 
 
 
With R&D Without R&D Difference 
with and 
 without 
R&D 
Scandal Normal Scandal – 
Normal 
Scandal Normal Scandal – 
Normal 
 
Gindex -0.041*** 
(-2.83) 
-0.035*** 
(-3.91) 
-0.006 
(-0.34) 
-0.024*** 
(-2.50) 
-0.024*** 
(-3.51) 
-0.000 
(-0.05) 
-0.005 
(-0.25) 
Eindex -0.123*** 
(-4.14) 
-0.091*** 
(-4.98) 
-0.033 
(-0.93) 
-0.064*** 
(-3.24) 
-0.052*** 
(-3.66) 
-0.012 
(-0.53) 
-0.020 
(-0.48) 
***Statistically significant at the 1% level, **statistically significant at the 5% level, and 
*statistically significant at the 10% level, respectively. Control variables are included in 
each regression specification but are not presented in the table. 
G. Choice of Methodology 
As described above, our methodology has been to examine the relationship 
between a firm’s index governance ratings and its Tobin’s Q. The hypothesis 
we test relates to the impact of governance changes on the market’s 
assesssments of firm value. Only the numerator of Tobin’s Q relates to the 
market assessment of a firm’s value, with the denominator relating to its book 
value. Given this, one might ask whether it would be better instead to explore 
our hypothesis by undertaking event studies on the impact on firm value of 
changes in each the various governance attributes that are scored in the G and 
E indices. Doing so, it might be argued, would avoid any of the noise 
introduced by changes in book value that are a component of calculating a 
firm’s Q. 
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Notwithstanding the concerns driving such a question, we have chosen our 
Q-based methodological approach for a number of reasons. First, and most 
important, the index studies have been subject to trenchent critiques based on 
the argument that theory suggests they should not get any results. A primary 
goal of this Article is to help explain why they neverheless can. The index 
studies examine the relationship between a firm’s governance rating and its Q 
and so any effort to explain their results requires a comparable approach. 
Second, doing an event study introduces its own kinds of noise. This is in part 
because, for many of governance changes under study here, it would be hard 
specify with any precision when the market became aware of the change. Also, 
the scandal period was charactized by substantial discontinuities in the 
volatility of individual firm share prices, which make event studies harder to 
undertake and interpret. Third, we have no reason to believe that any noise 
introduced by a change in the book values of the firms under study would 
introduce bias that would drive our results. Assuming there is no such bias, the 
added noise should work against our finding statistiscally significant results. 
The fact that we nevertheless do find such results tends, if anything, to 
strengthen the support that they provide for our hypothesis. 
This said, our effort here is at the vanguard of what we hope will develop 
into a deep vein of studies seeking to better understand the contextual nature of 
the impact of corporate governance. If other scholars wish to extend our work 
by examining through event studies the signaling aspect of corporate 
governance changes, we would welcome their efforts. 
IV. LARGER LESSONS 
In this Part, we discuss the larger lessons of our findings and how they 
illuminate current debates in corporate governance.  
A. The Under-Theorization of Empirical Corporate Governance Studies 
A rich literature has developed in recent years concerning the connection 
between corporate governance and corporate performance. The G and E index 
studies play an important role in this literature, helping to give it an empirical 
foundation.201 But also important is the developing scholarship criticizing these 
index studies.202 As noted briefly earlier, these critics argue that a correct 
understanding of the institutional context is inconsistent with any plausible 
causal connection between many of the governance attributes scored by the 
indices and corporate value creation.203 Accordingly, they assert that many of 
 
201 See supra note 8 (summarizing key studies laying out G and E index methodologies). 
202 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 10 and accompanying text (summarizing 
scholarship arguing index studies cannot adequately explain how governance changes 
impact firm value). 
203 See, e.g., Klausner, supra note 10, at 1349-50 (arguing that evidence shows no causal 
link between many takeover defenses and reduced share value). 
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these attributes cannot possibly have an impact on corporate performance.204 
Their prime example is the poison pill.205 The pill can be adopted very quickly 
and easily without a shareholder vote when management is faced with an 
immediate takeover threat.206 So, the critics argue, while a firm’s index rating 
will be affected by whether or not it has a pill, the presence or absence of a pill 
at any point prior to an immediate takeover threat cannot be of consequence. 
Because a pill can be quickly adopted, in effect all firms have a “shadow” pill 
regardless of whether one has yet been formally adopted.207 Despite the 
seeming logic of this argument, a recent empirical study, using ever more 
sophisticated econometrics, reports that certain defensive tactics such as 
having a pill in place do in fact result in fewer future takeovers. The authors of 
this study, though, stress that their results are “atheoretic”: no hypotheses are 
offered to explain the link between these governance provisions and 
shareholders’ receipt of fewer premium offers.208  
In essence, these various empirical corporate governance results have gotten 
ahead of the capacity of existing theory to explain them. In our view, the 
reason for this theoretical shortfall is because the impact of corporate 
governance on performance is more contextual than is generally understood. 
The G and E index studies, for example, only measure the average impact of a 
set of attributes on firm value across a large number of corporations over a 
considerable period of time. Because these studies do not distinguish between 
different times and circumstances, they observe only an average, and most 
firms are not average. As noted in the introduction, careful observers of the 
corporate world would find it highly likely that, rather than a single link 
between the specified corporate governance provisions and performance, a 
range of linkages are possible whose direction and intensity depend centrally 
on the particular context in which a firm is operating. From this perspective, 
the impact of governance on firm performance is second order except when 
circumstances make it important. Thus, the impact of governance depends on 
the particular characteristics of both the time and the firm involved. Our 
empirical study of the signaling hypothesis exemplifies this hypothesis: the 
strength of the signaling link between governance and performance was much 
greater in the scandal period than in the normal period and more for R&D 
firms than for non-R&D firms. 
 
204 See, e.g., id. at 1365-67 (reviewing many elements of G-index that do not impact 
corporate governance). 
205 See Coates, supra note 11, at 271 (discussing relationship between poison pill and 
firm value). 
206 See id. at 287 (“For large, sophisticated targets, pill adoption can occur in a single 
business day . . . .”). 
207 See id. at 288 (describing idea of “shadow” pill). 
208 See Karpoff, Schonlau & Wehrly, supra note 13, at 1 (“[O]ur main inferences and 
contribution to the literature are based on data-driven, atheoretic tests that examine the 
relation between firms’ uses of specific provisions and their takeover likelihoods.”). 
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B. Plausibly Explaining the First Two Links Through Which Governance 
Affects Tobin’s Q 
We agree with many aspects of the argument put forth by the critics of the G 
and E index studies. Michael Klausner, for example, makes a very important 
point: with a better understanding of the institutional realities, the indices could 
have been constructed with considerably more subtlety so as to frame a better 
hypothesis between governance characteristics and firm performance.209 Still, 
in our view, a plausible story exists as to why, through the filtering and 
incentives/informedness links, firms with differently rated governance indices 
will on average differ in terms of value creation as measured by Tobin’s Q.  
1. Staggered Boards, Supermajority Provisions, Shareholder Written 
Actions, and Special Shareholder Meetings 
The presence of a staggered board is scored unfavorably by both indices. As 
Klausner himself relates, there are good reasons, both theoretically and 
empirically, to believe that a staggered board will lead to lower-value-creation 
managerial behavior because it provides managers protection from capital 
market discipline. Also, while it is true that certain other governance attributes 
scored unfavorably by one or both of the indices become largely irrelevant in 
the presence of a staggered board—supermajority provisions, limitations on 
shareholder action by written consent, and prohibitions on special shareholder 
meetings—they may well still be of consequence for the approximately forty 
percent of firms that do not have a staggered board. Moreover, as for the firms 
that do have staggered boards and thus are unfavorably scored for that 
attribute, many do not have these other negatively scored attributes: eighty 
percent do not have supermajority provisions, a majority do not limit 
shareholder action by written consent, and a majority do not prohibit special 
meetings, perhaps in each case for the very reason that they are irrelevant. In 
sum, we believe that there are reasons to believe that, on average across all 
firms and time periods, firms that score more favorably with respect to these 
various governance attributes would create more value. At the same time, we 
share with Klausner the belief that a recognition of interactions among the 
various attributes might well allow a much more precise prediction of the value 
creation capacity of individual firms and a more theoretically compelling 
explanation of why.  
2. Poison Pills 
As noted above, another key criticism of the index studies concerns the 
poison pill. Recall the argument that because a pill can be put in place quickly 
and easily when and if there is ever an actual takeover attempt, the firm 
without a pill is no less protected from capital market discipline than one with 
 
209 Klausner, supra note 10, at 1362-63 (critiquing failure of empirical literature to deal 
with institutional facts). 
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the pill and so should not be scored more favorably by the indices. Reality may 
not be so simple. For example, the absence of a poison pill may be value 
relevant for a firm that had had a pill in the past that management subsequently 
removed, perhaps to improve its governance image to institutional investors. 
To thereafter reinstate the pill at the time of a hostile takeover or proxy fight 
would tarnish management and hurt its chances in the fight against the 
potential hostile acquirer. There is empirical evidence consistent with this 
conjecture. Professors Vicente Cuñat, Mireia Giné, and Maria Guadalupe 
report that approval of a precatory shareholder proposal to remove an 
antitakeover proposal listed in the G index results in an increase of ten to 
twelve percent in the cumulative probability that the firm will be the target of a 
successful takeover within five years after the vote.210  
3. Other Scored Governance Attributes 
There are a number of items in the G index that concern governance 
attributes unrelated to entrenching incumbent management. These attributes 
can, at least in theory, affect performance by other means. For example, there 
is a tradeoff between attracting the best officers and directors, which may be 
aided by governance attributes such as indemnification and protection from 
exposure to money damage suits for fiduciary duty violations, and the deterrent 
effect of facing such damage actions without such indemnification or liability 
exposure protection. Such indemnification and liability protection are each 
scored as indicating poor governance by the G index.  
Whether or not a firm provides its managers with a golden parachute 
involves a similar tradeoff. On the one hand, because a parachute provides 
incumbent managers with a handsome payment if there is a takeover, it lessens 
their resistance to one. This increases the likelihood that if the firm is being 
poorly run, its assets will be transferred to more capable hands. On the other 
hand, the parachute lessens the sting of a takeover if one takes place and so 
weakens the incentive to do a good job in order to avoid a takeover. Both the G 
and E indices score the absence of a golden parachute favorably.  
It is unclear whether these G and E index scorings identify the right spot in 
terms of each of these tradeoffs. In other words, it is unclear with respect to 
each of these three attributes whether the index authors made the correct 
choice in terms of whether it is better to have the relevant provision at issue or 
not, i.e., the choice that, on average across all firms and time periods, results in 
firms with the more favorable rating creating more value. They may be making 
 
210 Vicente Cuñat, Mireia Giné & Maria Guadalupe, Price and Probability: 
Decomposing the Takeover Effects of Anti-Takeover Provisions 22 (Ctr. for Econ. Pol’y 
Research, Discussion Paper No. 12059, 2017), 
https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=12059#. The sample 
was composed of all shareholder-sponsored proposals to remove an antitakeover provision 
voted on in annual meetings of S&P 1500 firms between 1994 and 2013 (2820 proposals in 
931 different firms). Id. at 3-4.   
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the right choice, however, in which case their scoring of these attributes helps 
explain the G and E index study results. In any event, consistent with our 
larger thesis, the critical point is that the relation between governance and 
performance is contextual: the tradeoff for any given firm at any given point in 
time self-evidently might vary considerably from what on average is best. 
These questions are left unanswered because of the absence of studies that take 
a more nuanced approach concerning under which circumstances these 
governance attributes in fact matter and in what direction. 
B. The Significance of the Plausible Story’s Lack of Proof 
We have just presented a story as to why firms with differently rated 
governance structures will on average differ in terms of value creation as 
measured by Tobin’s Q. This story is plausible. But in substantialparts it is 
unproven, and in some parts even quite speculative. What is the significance of 
this lack of proof? 
The first point to make is that the index study critics are putting forth a 
theory as to why the index studies should not get their empirical results, but no 
theory as to why they nevertheless do. Our plausible story is a theory as to why 
they do. So we would say to the critics, it takes a theory to beat a theory. More 
importantly, though, our story recognizes the more contingent and contextual 
nature of the relationship between governance and value creation and in so 
doing provides the first sketch of a guide for future empirical research.  
The second point goes to our signaling hypothesis. Whatever the validity of 
our story here about how governance structure ratings affect Tobin’s Q through 
the first two links—filtering and incentives/informedness—we have 
empirically demonstrated the existence of a third link involving signaling. The 
index critics might respond that if we are unable to show why the filtering and 
incentives/informedness links work, our empirical results relating to signaling 
lack a theory as well. Proof of our story, they might suggest, requires z 
showing that it would be more costly for low quality managers to adopt a 
rating improving governance change than for high quality managers to do so. 
Without this higher cost for low quality managers, such a governance change 
would not be a credible signal of managerial quality. Proving our story is 
difficult because the effectiveness of particular defensive techniques is also 
contextual: the circumstances of a particular company may cause a technique 
that may not be generally effective to be protective in particular circumstances.  
In a situation where context matters, however, it is sufficient to note what 
our empirical results demonstrate: score-altering governance changes have 
larger impacts on Tobin’s Q in situations where information asymmetry 
concerning managerial quality is greater. Given this finding, if it were not 
costly to the managers of at least some firms to improve their governance 
score, every firm would have an incentive to do so, with the result that all 
companies—those with good managers and those with bad managers—would 
change their governance in the same direction during the sample period. We 
observe that this is not the case. Hence one can infer that whatever the reasons, 
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there is some benefit to a more highly rated governance structure, but obtaining 
this benefit is more costly for low quality managers than for high quality ones. 
The alternative inference is that managers make changes in governance 
structure randomly. We are aware of nothing in the literature that makes this 
claim or offers evidence consistent with it. 
CONCLUSION 
Prior scholarship reports a relationship between firms with good corporate 
governance index ratings and those best at creating shareholder value, results 
that our study confirms.211 However, little work explores why we observe this 
relationship. We hypothesize that, in the right context, a rating-altering change 
of corporate governance structure can signal the quality of a firm’s 
management. This is because a change in governance structure that makes a 
firm’s management more vulnerable to a hostile takeover, or that gives 
independent directors or activist shareholders more voice, imposes greater 
costs on poor quality managers than on good quality ones. A positive signal 
concerning the quality of management would lead to a positive reevaluation by 
the market of a firm’s future cash flows and hence an increase in the firm’s 
Tobin’s Q, with a negative signal having the opposite effect. 
We test this hypothesis by focusing on 2000-2002. This is the period of 
unprecedented corporate accounting scandals, such as Enron and WorldCom, 
involving the fall from grace of some of America’s largest and most respected 
companies. Commentators at the time reported concern about where the “next 
shoe would drop” and, more generally, expressed reduced confidence in the 
accounting behind all firms’ reports of past performances. The market thus 
perceived a greater information asymmetry between it and corporate insiders 
concerning the quality of firm management. The signal of management quality 
arising from a change in governance structure, even though always noisy, 
would take on added value in this environment where the market participants 
felt they otherwise know less than usual about managerial quality.  
We compare results testing the relationship between firms’ governance 
indices score and Tobin’s Q in this 2000-2002 accounting scandal period with 
results from the same tests in the years surrounding the accounting scandal 
period (1992-1999 and 2003-2006). The comparison involves both the results 
from fixed effects tests of the impact of an index rating-altering governance 
structure change on Tobin’s Q in any given year, and the results of cross 
sectional OLS tests on the relationship in any given year between firm 
governance ratings and firm Tobin’s Qs. The comparison of the fixed effects 
tests reveals that a changed governance index score in the accounting scandal 
years is associated with a much larger change in Tobin’s Q than a comparably 
sized rating change occurring in the surrounding years. This difference is 
highly significant both statistically and economically.  
 
211 See supra note 10 (discussing this relationship). 
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In contrast, the comparison of the OLS results, which are dominated by 
firms that did not change, shows no significant difference in terms of the 
relationship between a firm’s governance index rating and its Tobin’s Q during 
the accounting scandal period (2000-2002) relative to the surrounding years. 
The difference between the fixed effects comparison and the OLS comparison 
strongly suggests that signaling was at work. The fact that the OLS finding for 
2000-2002 is not significantly different from the OLS finding for these other 
years suggests that there was no significant difference between the scandal 
period and normal period in terms of the filtering and incentive/informedness 
effects of a good corporate governance structure. This is because the OLS 
results relate to observations a large majority of which involve firms that did 
not change their governance structure. So the fact that that there was a 
significantly greater impact on Tobin’s Q during the scandal period relative to 
the normal period for firms that did change suggests that it must have been the 
third link between governance structure and performance—signaling—that 
became stronger in the scandal period, a period with heightened information 
asymmetry. 
We strongly suspect that the signaling feature of a change in governance 
structure is not confined to 2000-2002. The market also did not know 
everything about management in 1996-1999 and 2003-2006. Likely, what we 
are seeing in 2000-2002 is simply a larger than usual signaling effect because, 
in this period, the market was abnormally uncertain about the quality of 
management based on the other information available and so the value-
relevance of the signal even if still noisy, was greater. This conclusion, relating 
to differences in information asymmetry across time periods, is bolstered by 
our study relating to differences in information asymmetry across different 
types of firms. Thus, in response to the question we posed at the outset—why 
the observed relationship between governance ratings and Tobin’s Q and under 
what circumstances would governance structure particularly matter—we 
believe that signaling can play a substantial role at least in certain contexts.  
The idea that governance structure choices can serve a signaling function is 
an important conclusion in and of itself. Reducing asymmetry of information 
between the market and corporate insiders significantly enhances the efficiency 
of the economy. It allows improved monitoring of managers so that they are 
under more pressure to utilize well a firm’s existing productive assets and to 
make good decisions concerning investments in new projects.  
The more accurate share prices that result from reduced asymmetries also 
help the efficiency with which capital is allocated by external capital markets 
and make trading markets more liquid. A variety of regulations are designed, at 
least in part, to reduce these asymmetries, including our mandatory issuer 
disclosure regime and the antifraud rules concerning trading on private 
information. In designing public policy, it is important to appreciate as well the 
role that the actions of private actors can play in reducing these asymmetries. 
Our results give new insight in this regard. They also suggest how sharply 
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asymmetries about management quality can grow if regulatory and gatekeeper 
failures allow a substantial number of accounting frauds to develop. 
Even more important is the larger lesson of our results and their contribution 
to the law and finance literature concerning corporate governance. These 
results are strong evidence that the impact of governance is in important 
respects contextual, depending on the particular circumstances of the time 
involved and the particular characteristics of the firms involved. This point, 
consistent with the familiar but unsupported claim that one size of governance 
does not fit all, helps illuminate the current debate concerning the corporate 
governance index studies. It suggests that that there is theory that can help 
explain the index studies’ strong empirical results linking governance structure 
with firm value creation, but that, rather than a single link between the 
specified corporate governance provisions and performance, a range of 
linkages are possible whose direction and intensity depend centrally on the 
particular context in which a firm is operating. 
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